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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to reconsider the current position of American exceptionalism in 
American society and its influence on U.S. grand strategy with regard to the future direction 
of U.S. world leadership. It offers an introduction to the debate on American exceptionalism, 
and argues that American exceptionalism has a profound impact on the formulation of 
strategy. Thus any adjustments in Americans sense of self may lead to great changes in its 
national interests and significantly alter its role in the world. 
The thesis analyses whether there has been a shift in the American population’s beliefs, 
values and self-understanding the past decades. In order to provide answers, trends in 
American society such as religiosity, economic mobility and patriotism are examined, and 
the continued influence of American exceptionalism on American grand strategy is 
discussed. 
The main findings of this thesis are as follows; the American public is turning away from core 
pillars of American exceptionalism which has led to a more sober and pragmatic self-image. 
This, in addition to the current security environment, has led to ambivalent views on the 
appropriate global strategy for the United States as it faces its future. The uncertainty about 
the future role of the United States in the world has already caused erosions in the 
international system. As such, this thesis also discusses the implications for the liberal world 
order if the declined belief in America as an exceptional nation leads the United States 
toward abandonment of some of its idealistic foundations. 
This thesis proposes a hybrid strategy which corresponds with the current international and 
domestic setting. A strategy based on a continued leadership role for the United States, but 
at a lower cost due to higher levels of burden-sharing between America’s allies and partners. 
In addition, a combination of balance of power realism and discriminate intervention, with 
focus on multilateral institutions of liberal internationalism, represents fundamental aspects 
of American strategic culture and the ebb and flow between interests and ideals in American 
foreign policy. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Throughout the nation’s history, Americans have debated how to balance their priorities at 
home with their involvement in international affairs. The pendulum has fluctuated between 
greater and lesser willingness to engage in the world which, in part, is due to the unique 
dynamics that shape America’s role in the world. Traditionally, American grand strategy 
reflects a tension between idealism on one side, and realism on the other. While realist 
systemic and material principles represent the basis for U.S. grand strategy, the deep roots 
of idealism in American society connects the ends and means of its strategy to its liberal and 
democratic political system and values.  
Ideals and national interests are often presented as mutually exclusive principles in 
international relations, but some scholars, among them Robert E. Osgood (1953: 1-23), 
emphasize that to comprehend American foreign policy it is necessary to understand the 
reconciliation of the two. He argued that the sole focus on national interest proved 
inaccurate in strategic analyses of America after World War II, and stated that idealism was 
«an indispensable spur to reason in leading men to perceive and act upon the real 
imperatives of power politics» (ibid: 448). Accordingly, any study of U.S. grand strategy must 
consider the special and complex synthesis between idealism and realism which represents a 
guiding principle for policy formulation in the United States.  
The objective of this thesis is to further elaborate on a fundamental element of this idealism; 
the belief in American exceptionalism which relates to the domestic idea about the nature of 
the country the United States and entails deep-rooted American beliefs about its political 
system, its national identity, and its ideals, values and interests. In order to understand the 
complex nature of the American world order, it is necessary to understand the complex 
character of the American people which endorses contradictory impulses in foreign policy 
and ambivalent views on what role, if any, the United States should play in the world. 
The premise of this thesis is that American exceptionalism profoundly affects how the 
United States acts and justifies its behavior in the world. The unique American sense of self 
and the special reconciliation between idealism and realism in U.S. strategic culture, in 
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addition to a clear operational concept, has provided stability, continuity and predictability 
in American grand strategy over time. Idealism has a uniquely important role for the 
formulation of U.S. grand strategy, and the continued importance of idealistic values and 
ideals in the nation’s grand strategic course is dependent on the preservation of the 
exceptional American self-understanding (Melby 1995: 34). 
 
1.1 Backdrop on American Exceptionalism 
 
Louis J. Halle (1960: 1) asserts that there has been one constant theme defining the history 
of American foreign policy. It is a theme of such importance that it dominates virtually every 
foreign policy debate and every significant decision. He argues that this theme takes the 
«form of a tension, a polarity in our thinking, a conflict in our national desires or attitudes 
which at critical moments in history has divided our people». The tension between active 
participation in world politics and withdrawal, or aloofness or abstinence; between 
involvement and isolation, between alignment and neutrality, has shaped U.S. foreign policy 
behavior throughout the history of the nation.  
When explaining state behavior in the international system some scholars focus on domestic 
characteristics such as norms, ideas and strategic culture, while others focus on international 
pressures, the global distribution of power and national interests. While the concepts of 
power and culture are often presented as entirely incompatible, and ideals and national 
interest as mutually exclusive principles, several realist scholars try to bridge that gap by 
including domestic-level factors when explaining foreign policy behavior. These neoclassical 
realist scholars highlight the fact that even though state behavior first and foremost is 
explained by systemic factors, these factors must be interpreted through intervening 
variables at the domestic level to have explanatory power (Dueck 2006).  
International pressures and events have led to transitions in the history of American grand 
strategy, and adjustments in American national identity and its self-image have had a 
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profound effect and acted as a contributing factor to the change in the nation’s foreign 
policy course. In the United States this self-understanding can be understood as the 
phenomenon American exceptionalism. The upcoming sections will further highlight the 
importance of this phenomenon and underline this thesis’ decision to focus on the nature of 
America’s self-image as grounds for adjustment in grand strategy. 
Ever since the Founding of the American Republic this exceptional sense of self has 
influenced how the United States interacts with the rest of the world. It was represented in 
Washington’s Farewell Address, and in the Monroe Doctrine1 , in both the imperialism of 
Theodore Roosevelt and the internationalism of Woodrow Wilson, in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
mission to spread his «Four Freedoms», through the doctrines of the Cold War and the 
Reagan presidency, and in the Bush Doctrine after the attacks on 9/11 (McDougall 1997: 5; 
Kissinger 1994: 18). Still today it remains reflected in the core mission of the United States:  
As Americans, we will always have our differences, but what unites us is the national 
consensus that American global leadership remains indispensable. We embrace our 
exceptional role and responsibilities at a time when our unique contributions and capabilities 
are needed most, and when the choices we make today can mean greater security and 
prosperity for our Nation for decades to come (Obama 2015a). 
 
However, as soon as the United States suffers an economic, social or political setback, the 
belief in American exceptionalism is challenged and discussions on its future commence. K. J. 
Holsti (2011: 381) holds that the neoconservative turn during the Bush administration 
revived «discussion about exceptionalism as a theme in American foreign policy». Among 
others, Jonathan Monten (2005) highlighted the close relationship between the Bush 
Doctrine and the old tradition of American exceptionalism. Yet, the discussion did not end 
with the Bush presidency.  
From his first presidential campaign, Barack H. Obama has been presented by conservatives 
as a threat to the American way of life. He has been characterized as “anti-American”, 
                                                     
1
 The Monroe doctrine can be summarized as U.S. foreign policy regarding the Latin American colonies in 1823. It stated 
that the independent countries on the American continents were not to be considered subjects for future colonization by 
European powers, and that any further efforts by any European power to colonize or interfere on the continents would be 
viewed as a threat to American peace and security which would require American intervention. Source: U.S. Department of 
State (n.d.) Milestones: Monroe Doctrine 1823. Retrieved from: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe. 
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described as lacking American roots, and even being accused of not being born in the United 
States. Since entering the White House, conservatives started challenging President Obama’s 
belief in American exceptionalism as a more subtle way of expressing his anti-Americanism 
(Restad 2015). This assertion was strengthened by Obama’s response to a question of 
whether he believed in American exceptionalism at a G20 press conference in Strasbourg. 
He stated that he believes in American exceptionalism, but then added: «just as I suspect 
that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek 
exceptionalism» an answer which created great controversy at home. The fact that he 
continued by saying: «I’m enormously proud of my country and its role and history in the 
world» did not seem to appease or reassure the American people that Obama indeed shares 
this belief (Obama 2009). 
According to Terrence McCoy (2012), the term American exceptionalism appeared in U.S. 
publications 457 times from 1980 to 2000, while the next decade had it 2,558 times, before 
it dramatically leapt to 4,172 times between 2010 and 2012. The term became a central part 
of the 2012 presidential election, and campaign books emphasizing “American greatness” 
and criticizing Obama’s “disloyalty” were published by major Republican presidential 
candidates, including No Apology: The Case for American Greatness (2010) and Believe in 
America (2011) by Mitt Romney, and To Save America: Stopping Obama’s Secular- Socialist 
Machine (2011) and A Nation Like No Other: Why American Exceptionalism Matters (2011) 
by Newt Gingrich. 
The term was widely used during Romney’s campaign to highlight his love for America and to 
accuse Obama for not having «the same feelings about American exceptionalism that we 
do» (Beinart 20142). Former mayor of New York, Rudy Giuliani (2015a) revived the debate 
when he, earlier this year, stated: «I know this is a horrible thing to say, but I do not believe 
that the president loves America… He doesn’t love you. And he doesn’t love me». In efforts 
to clarify his opinion he told Fox News that «I don’t hear from him what I heard from Harry 
Truman, what I heard from Bill Clinton, what I heard from Jimmy Carter, which is these 
wonderful words about what a great country we are, what an exceptional country we are» 
(Giuliani 2015b). 
                                                     
2
 Article published in National Journal without page numbers. 
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Against this political backdrop, several academic journals have published special issues 
related to the importance of American exceptionalism. For instance the topic of the 
inaugural volume of American Political Thought in Spring 2012 was “American 
Exceptionalism: Is It Real, Is It Good?” and Review of Faith and International Affairs’ Summer 
2012 issue focused on “Religion and American Exceptionalism”. “Is America Still 
Exceptional?” was the main subject of The American Interest’s Spring 2013 issue. These 
publications discussed the various sources of American exceptionalism, and some attempted 
to reformulate the relationship between this belief and current U.S foreign policy (Cha 2015: 
2). 
The current debate on American exceptionalism can be understood as a symptom of the U.S. 
identity crisis that has formed in the wake of the erosion of the unipolar world order. The 
identity crisis is caused, in part, by the setbacks of the Bush administration. Taesuh Cha 
(2015:2) argues that: «reconsidering the meaning of American exceptional identity is not 
only a scholastic exercise, but an urgent practical problem regarding the future direction of 
U.S. world leadership». Therefore, the domestic idea about the nature of the country the 
United States will be decisive for future U.S. grand strategy and American leadership in the 
world.  
With reference to the neoclassical realist framework, the premise of this thesis is that 
American exceptionalism, defined as the national identity of the American people, has 
profound influence on American strategic thinking and the formulation of U.S. grand 
strategy. It justifies how the United States behaves in the world, and acts as a filter through 
which material and systemic factors are translated into strategic choice. The unique 
American sense of self and the synthesis between idealism and realism in American strategic 
culture, represents a guiding principle for policy formulation in the United States and 
endorses contradictory approaches to grand strategy. Accordingly, the preservation of 
American exceptionalism in American society will determine the nation's strategic course for 
years ahead.   
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1.2 Research design 
 
According to Hilde Restad (2012: 70), the question of whether the era of American 
exceptionalism is ending is irrelevant, and she argues that: «the United States is exceptional 
as long as Americans believe it to be exceptional». It is, therefore, essential to examine the 
current importance and presence of American exceptionalism in the United States, and the 
relationship between this old idea and current U.S. grand strategy. This will be studied by 
investigating contemporary trends in American society, and adjustments in American 
people’s values and beliefs. It will investigate empirically and systematically whether there 
has been a shift in the United States towards a more pragmatic attitude to America’s role in 
the world. Adjustments in this self-understanding may lead to great changes in America’s 
national interests and significantly alter its role in the world. Accordingly, the analysis will be 
structured around two questions in order to examine the current conditions of American 
exceptionalism. 
I. To what extent are the sources of American exceptionalism still present in American 
society today?  
II. What consequences might an adjustment in American exceptionalism have on 
America’s global role and strategy? 
 
In order to measure the theoretical concept American exceptionalism, it will be 
operationalized by clarifying the indicators through which one might examine its existence. 
Seymour M. Lipset (1996: 26) notes that America «is the most religious, optimistic, patriotic, 
rights-oriented, and individualistic» country in the world. And according to Peter Beinart 
(2014), the characteristics that constitutes American exceptionalism can be summarized in 
three attributes — religiosity, patriotism and mobility. These indicators are assumed to 
significantly shape and influence the way the United States conducts itself in the world and 
will be further examined in Chapter 4. 
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1.3 Thesis outline 
 
The first chapter has offered a short overview of the current debate on American 
exceptionalism, and provided the background for the need to examine whether there has 
been an adjustment in the American population’s beliefs, values and self-understanding. 
Chapter 2 provides the analytical and theoretical framework for this thesis. First, it gives a 
conceptual introduction of the term grand strategy, and secondly it presents the neoclassical 
realist model for explaining strategic adjustments. Chapter 3 defines the term American 
exceptionalism, offers an overview of the foundations of American exceptionalism and 
examines its impact on American foreign policy. In Chapter 4 a brief summary of the 
methodological framework for this research will be given and the indicators applied in the 
analysis will be discussed. Chapters 5 and 6 contains a two-part analysis seeking to answer 
the aforementioned questions on the continued role of American exceptionalism on 
American grand strategy. In order to provide answers to the first question, whether the 
conditions for American exceptionalism still apply today, trends in American society such as 
religiosity, economic and social mobility and patriotism will be examined. The second part of 
the analysis will provide a discussion on potential consequences for the formulation of grand 
strategy  and America’s global role if these conditions are permanently changed. Chapter 7 
will assess the overall findings; provide a summary of the thesis and a concluding discussion 
on key findings. 
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2 The importance of domestic 
characteristics on American grand strategy 
 
This chapter will provide the analytical framework for the study of American grand strategy, 
and the theoretical approach that serves as the foundation of the central premise of this 
thesis; that American exceptionalism profoundly affects how the United States formulates 
its grand strategy, and that adjustments in this self-understanding may lead to great changes 
in America’s national interests and significantly alter its role in the world. 
 
2.1 Analytical framework 
 
In order to guide the subsequent analysis of the effects of American exceptionalism on grand 
strategic choice, this section will offer a definition of the term grand strategy and a 
clarification of the strategic alternatives available to American leaders and policymakers.  
 
2.1.1 Grand Strategy 
 
Carl von Clausewitz’s On War, offers the following definition of grand strategy: «Strategy [is] 
the use of engagements for the object of the war» (Clausewitz as quoted in Gray 1999: 17). 
The Clausewitzian definition and his distinction between tactical means and strategic ends 
still remain at the core of this term today. The concept of grand strategy was first used to 
describe what British military theorist Sir Basil Liddell Hart called the “higher level” of war-
time strategy. This higher level coordinates all of a state’s available resources, be it military 
or non-military instruments of power, toward the political ends of a given war (Gray 1999: 
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18). In recent years, the concept of grand strategy has expanded to incorporate both tactical 
means and political ends. The term is no longer limited to achieving political ends only in 
circumstances of war; it also comprises periods of peace and a range of peacetime goals.  
 
Figure 2.1 Line of causation in grand strategic choice 
 
Colin Dueck (2006: 9-10) puts forward the following limits to the definition of grand strategy:  
1. Grand Strategy is understood as the calculated relationship of ends and means in the 
face of one or more potential opponents. The essence of strategy and the process of 
formulating one involve the identification and reconciliation of national goals and 
resources, and setting priorities in the face of potential resistance. In a world of 
uncertainty and limited resources, in which states may or may not cooperate, 
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strategic decisions are necessary to further one’s interests in the face of conflicting 
and opposing views.  
2. Grand strategy seems only to exist when there is the possibility of the use of force 
externally. Strategy also refers to the balancing on the part of states in the face of 
potential armed conflict with other international entities: states, terrorists and so on. 
This indicates that the military policy instrument is an essential part of grand 
strategy. 
3. The pursuit of political, economic or ideological interests, ends, and objectives, is also 
an important part of grand strategy as it includes the use of non-military means such 
as diplomacy and foreign aid. 
 
Accordingly, any grand strategy will involve the identification and prioritization of national 
interests, goals and objectives, as well as any potential threats to such interests and the 
resources and means with which a state will meet threats to protect its interests. In the 
words of John Lewis Gaddis (1982: viii), it is «the process by which ends are related to 
means, intentions to capabilities, objectives to resources».  
To have a coherent grand strategy is imperative for nations as it provides an overarching 
sense of purpose in international affairs. In addition, strategic doctrines help build domestic 
support for the nation’s policies abroad. Dueck (2006: 11) adds that a grand strategy is a 
conceptual road map that describes how to combine identified resources to the promotion 
of identified interests, and it contributes in the process of how to rank interests, assess 
threats, and adapt resources. It can also be seen as a set of policy prescriptions, as any grand 
strategy provides clear guidelines to the use of policy instruments such as: the form and 
level of defense spending, the nature and extent of strategic commitments abroad, the 
deployment of military forces abroad, the use of foreign aid, the use of diplomacy with 
current or potential allies, and the diplomatic stance taken toward real or potential 
adversaries. 
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2.1.2 American Grand Strategy 
 
Thomas Wright (20133) divides the debate on grand strategy into two camps, ‘restrainers’ 
and ‘shapers’, that contrast each other in their views about how the United States should 
engage in the world. For restrainers, solving domestic challenges should be of higher priority 
than international commitments. Meanwhile, shapers focus on the United States’ role as a 
global power and believe that it cannot «take a sabbatical to tend to the home front» as 
developments in the Middle East, East Asia or Europe could damage American interests in 
the world. While restrainers prefer a light footprint in the use of force to avoid the slippery 
slope into the messes of sustained involvements. Shapers believe the United States must 
remain a global leader and influence developments all over the world, and particularly in 
conflict-prone regions. Different interpretations of the challenges to American power lead to 
different approaches to grand strategy. In sum, restrainers seek to limit U.S. engagement in 
international events, while shapers seek to influence them. 
Categories of U.S. Grand Strategy 
 
The division of grand strategy into alternative categories is a good premise for an analysis of 
a country’s grand strategy. The different categories represent a given country’s emphasis on 
certain key elements of strategy, and the necessary strategic decisions and trade-offs in its 
formulation to further one’s interests in the international system. Accordingly, they indicate 
a given country’s interests, values, priorities and preferences in relation to national security.  
These categories should be understood as “ideal types” of strategy, meaning sets of ideas 
shared by policymakers about how to maximize state security. A country’s actual grand 
strategy will often be a hybrid of one or two such ideal types (Kreps 2009: 634). Different 
approaches to grand strategy can be distinguished on the basis of several factors, according 
to their foreign policy objectives and means, their basic premises about the international 
                                                     
3
 Article published by Foreign Policy without page numbers. 
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politics, their preferred political and military instruments, and their preference between the 
use of national or international collective means (Miller 2010: 28-29; Melby 2009: 8-9). 
One might consider the possible strategic options for the United States as a spectrum of 
ideal types from restraint (complete political and economic isolation) to assertiveness 
(coercive hegemony). While the extremes of the spectrum are not considered viable options, 
the distance that separates the other strategies from the respective ends of the spectrum is 
of interest. These five options will be discussed further, and they will contribute to the 
analytical framework for the upcoming analysis. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Spectrum of U.S strategic options 
 
Neo-isolationism. This is the least ambitious and most restrained category of grand strategy 
as it largely focuses on the defense of the American homeland. It emphasizes a narrow 
definition of interests as national defense, and subscribes to a minimal or defensive realist 
view of international politics. Neo-isolationists hold that national defense will seldom justify 
interventions abroad.  However, while seeking to avoid entanglements in foreign policy and 
political conflicts, this strategy opens for economic and diplomatic relations (Posen and Ross 
1996/97: 7-14, Hoffman 2013: 23) 
Offshore Balancing. Presented as a variant of restraint in grand strategy, this is a more 
classical strategy whose main ambition is to secure vital national interests and balance 
against geopolitical challenges. This approach advocates a significant reduction in U.S. 
strategic commitments as its financial and economic constraints highlight the need for the 
United States to set clear strategic priorities, including a transformation of the military into a 
smaller force and a pullback of American forces abroad (Posen 2013: 118, Hoffman 2013: 
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23). It also calls for deeper reliance on regional allies and an international role for the United 
States as a ‘balancer of last resort’ (McDonough 2009: 11). 
Selective engagement. This approach emerges from the realist tradition of foreign policy 
and it shares its focus on the balance of power (Art 2003). It is more assertive than the two 
previous options, more discriminate in the use of force, and more selective as to where U.S. 
interests are defined and protected. This approach calls for a more restrained strategy 
without humanitarian interventions or an American role as world police. Its main objective is 
the application of U.S. power in order to maintain regional balances and great power peace4, 
but allows for long-term alliances, foreign military bases and commitments under a number 
of possible scenarios. However, the United States should, according to this strategy, be 
concerned with maintaining military commitments in Europe and Asia, as well as a presence 
in the Persian Gulf to forestall competition to its national interests (Posen and Ross 1996/97: 
17-23). 
Cooperative security. This strategy is more assertive as it encourages alliances and 
commitments abroad regardless of economic or geopolitical position, given that the United 
States receives support from the international system. It provides a guideline for an 
American global role founded on liberal principles and humanitarianism, with the use of 
collective institutional means, and the prohibition of armed aggression. It holds high 
potential for institutions like NATO and the UN to coordinate the deterrence and defeat of 
aggression, and for arms control and confidence-building measures to minimize security 
dilemmas. This strategy involves an emphasis on multilateralism and is connected to the 
notion of human security. This highlights the pressing need for the United States and its 
allies to build credibility and to increase their willingness to undertake humanitarian 
interventions (Posen and Ross 1996/97: 23-32; McDonough 2009: 9). 
Primacy. Grand strategies following this approach are the most assertive ones, based on the 
belief that the United States’ preeminent position of material power in the international 
system is the key to ensuring peace. The main objective is the preservation of American 
supremacy which is achieved by further increasing its military capabilities, by containing any 
                                                     
4
 A condition of relative peace, meaning the absence of armed conflict or any major confrontation between great powers or 
important actors in the international system. 
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serious competitor to the hegemonic world order, and by disciplining misbehaviors all over 
the world without relying on outside approval or support (Posen and Ross 1996/97: 32). 
Accordingly, this approach involves a greater amount of military power, unilateralism and 
willingness to use military forces than the other options, and it seeks to dissuade 
competitors from challenging U.S. interests. It emphasizes the use of military means to 
promote democracy and state-building efforts. Because of this, it is also the most expensive 
strategic option (Hoffman 2013: 23). 
 
Table 2.1 Summary of U.S. Grand Strategic Options 
 
 Neo-
Isolationism 
Offshore 
balancing 
Selective 
engagement 
Cooperative 
security 
Primacy 
Premise Minimal/ 
defensive 
realism 
Realism Traditional 
realism 
Liberalism, 
human 
security 
Maximal/ 
offensive 
realism 
Foreign 
policy 
Strategic 
restraint, 
deterrence 
Balancing 
regional 
competitor 
Preparation 
for major 
peers 
Assertive 
provided 
support and 
legitimacy 
Assertive 
interventionist, 
democracy 
promotion 
World 
order 
Distant 
balance of 
power 
Balance of 
power 
Balance of 
power 
Inter-
dependence 
Hegemonic 
Role of 
alliances 
Minimal Ad-hoc basis 
 
Focus on key 
alliances 
Heavy 
reliance 
More 
unilateral 
Willing-
ness to 
use force 
Lowest 
 
Low 
Self-defense 
More 
discriminate 
based on 
interests 
Nearly in-
discriminate, 
humanitarian 
interventions 
High 
Source: Posen and Ross (1996/97: 4) and Hoffman (2013: 24). 
 
15 
 
2.2 Theoretical framework 
 
This section will outline the theoretical framework and highlight the importance of domestic 
characteristics in formulation of grand strategy. When explaining state behavior in the 
international system some scholars focus on domestic characteristics such as norms, ideas 
and strategic culture, while others focus on international pressures, the global distribution of 
power and national interests. 
While the ideas of power and culture often get presented as entirely incompatible, and 
ideals and national interest as mutually exclusive principles, several realist scholars try to 
bridge that gap by including domestic-level factors when explaining foreign policy behavior. 
Therefore, the utility of a neoclassical realist approach when seeking to explain why states 
behave and act the way they do in the international system, as well as underlining its 
contribution when applied to the subject of grand strategy, will be presented. Specifically, it 
provides a more precise model for understanding how international and cultural variables 
interact to shape and determine patterns of strategic choice (Dueck 2006: 20). 
 
2.2.1 The impact of ideas on politics 
 
[…] the most important things to know about a society and its politics are its prevailing 
assumptions. Understanding how these assumptions become dominant, what role they play 
in determining policy while ascendant, and why they are replaced by other sets of 
assumptions should be at the heart of political science (Mehta 2011: 45-46) 
 
Daniel Béland and Robert H. Cox (2011: 3-4) argue that across social science, ideas are 
increasingly seen as a primary source of political behavior. Ideas can either be defined 
descriptively as “causal beliefs”, meaning assumptions about the world around us and about 
how things are connected (ibid.), or as normative ideas; that is values and beliefs about how 
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the world should be. Jal Mehta’s (2011: 27-42) typology distinguishes between three 
different levels of ideas: ideas as policy solutions, as problem definitions, and as public 
philosophies or zeitgeist. This division contributes to our understanding of how each idea 
affects politics, and the interaction among the different levels. Public philosophies, meaning 
broader sets of assumptions about government and society, «are meta-problem definitions 
that shape how more specific problems are defined, which, in turn, affects which specific 
policy ideas seem to be viable solutions to the problem» (ibid: 43). 
In terms of foreign policy, Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993: 12-24) suggest 
that under conditions of uncertainty, ideas hold the potential of influencing policy outcomes 
as they “serve as road maps” and “focal points” that affect strategic choice and give 
definition to goals, means and ends. Ideas, once institutionalized in the society, constrain 
public policy as they shape the solutions to problems. The role of ideas on politics as 
explained by Goldstein and Keohane is criticized by Vivian A. Schmidt (2011: 52) for its focus 
on objective interests over subjective ideas and beliefs about these interests.  
Instead, she argues that «institutions are better understood as the carriers of ideas or 
“collective memories”» making them connected to the national political discourse, In 
addition, she believes that subjective interests should replace objective ones, «as ideas 
about interests […] bring in a much wider range of strategic ideas and social norms» (ibid.), 
and that institutions serve both as structures that constrain actions and as constructs 
created and changed by actors through a discursive process. By viewing politics in such a 
manner, ideas which are generated among policy actors and spread to the public by political 
actors through discourse and ideational exchange, are key to explaining both institutional 
change and continuity (ibid: 55).  
 
2.2.2 Power and culture as decisive factors for strategic choice 
 
The view that the international system is anarchic and that the distribution of power 
regulates a given state’s behavior and the policies it leads toward the rest of the world is 
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fundamental to realist theory of international relations. As the world consists of states with 
opposing interest, each state always faces the threat of conflict, violence and war which, in 
order to survive, makes it reliant upon its material capabilities and its relative position in the 
international system. This fact underlines the realist premise that changes in grand strategy 
are shaped by material or structural pressures at the international level, and that domestic-
level differences tend to lose any explanatory power when faced with the pervasive 
pressures of international competition (Dueck 2006: 16-18). 
Meanwhile, constructivist scholars who focus on cultural factors to explain changes in 
strategy argue that international pressures must be interpreted and represented 
subjectively, through a cultural process, to have any effect on strategic choice. The revived 
legitimacy of cultural variables after the unexpected end of the Cold war coincides with 
revived scholarly interest in ideas and domestic politics (Katzenstein 1996: 4-5). It is possible 
to trace the idea that culture could influence strategic outcomes back to classic works, 
including the writings of Thucydides, Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz. But it was not until 
1977, when Jack Snyder developed a theory of ‘strategic culture’ to understand Soviet 
nuclear doctrine, that culture was connected to modern security studies (Lantis and Howlett 
2007: 84-85).  
Individuals are socialized into a distinctively Soviet mode of strategic thinking. As a result of 
this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes and behavioral patterns with 
regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the 
level of ‘culture’ rather than mere ‘policy’. Of course, attitudes may change as a result of 
changes in technology and the international environment. However, new problems are not 
assessed objectively. Rather, they are seen through the perceptual lens provided by the 
strategic culture (Snyder 1977: v).  
 
Since Jack Snyder introduced the term of ‘strategic culture’ it has grown to become an 
integral part of the international relations vocabulary (Toje 2009: 3). The past decades have 
seen an increased interest in the study of culture and strategy, and according to Alistair Iain 
Johnston (1995a: 36), the conceptual debate on strategic culture can be divided into three 
generations, separated in time and main focus. The first generation, which emerged in the 
early 1980s, mainly focused on the differences between the United States and the Soviet 
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Union in terms of nuclear strategy. They argued that differences in strategic culture were 
caused by unique variations in macro environmental variables such as history, political 
culture, and geography. Colin Gray (1986: 37) contended that: «strategic culture and 
national style have very deep roots within a particular stream of historical experience».  
The premise of rhetoric and intent, the difference between what leaders claim they are 
doing and the motives behind these actions, was the main focus of the second generation 
(Johnston 1995a: 39). One example is Bradley Klein (1988) who distinguished between 
declaratory and operational policies, where the first policy was used as a cover to justify the 
actual operational policy and American strategic culture of power projection. The third 
generation started in the early 1990s with a more narrow definition of strategic culture that, 
for the most part, excluded behavior as an element. The literature rather focused on 
particular strategic decisions as dependent variables with a wide range of research focuses 
as the independent variable, for example military culture, political-military culture, or 
organizational culture (Katzenstein 1996; Desch 1998: 142).   
After the Cold War, the study of strategic culture developed to include other nations and 
other security affairs than those of the previous era. Classic examples include Alastair Iain 
Johnston’s (1995b) exploration of the strategic culture of “cultural realism” in Chinese 
security policy during the Ming dynasty; in his study of Anglo-German dynamics during 
World War II, Jeffrey Legro (1995) contends that militaries have different organizational 
cultures that will lead them use different strategies; Thomas Berger’s (1998) coverage of the 
unique antimilitarist strategic culture that became deeply rooted in German and Japanese 
security policy in the post-Cold War era; Elizabeth Kier’s (1995) study of France between the 
two World Wars which shows the importance of organizational culture in the development 
of military doctrine; and Samuel P. Huntington’s (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of World Order in which he contends that the new patterns of conflict are 
between nations and groups of different civilizations. The current security environment also 
presents opportunities for further studies of strategic culture considering the erosion in the 
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unipolar world order and the emergence of the European Union and China5 as important 
actors in the system (Toje 2009: 7) 
 
Table 2.2. Potential sources of strategic culture 
 
Demographic Political Social/cultural 
Geography 
Climate 
Natural resources 
Generational change 
Technology 
Historical experience 
Political System 
Elite Beliefs 
Military Organizations 
Myths and symbols 
Defining texts 
Religion 
 
Source: Lantis and Howlett (2007: 86)  
 
Considering the value of American exceptionalism in the formulation of grand strategy in the 
United States, this thesis will utilize the following definition of strategic culture: a set of 
interlocking values, beliefs and assumptions that are held collectively by the people of a 
given state that relate to political and military strategic affairs, and that are passed on 
through socialization (Dueck 2006: 14-15). Culture is a factor of great significance as it can 
shape strategic choice in several ways; it affects the manner in which international events, 
pressures, and conditions are perceived (Berger 1998: 9, 12), it provides a set of causal 
beliefs regarding the efficient pursuit of national interests (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 13-
17), and it helps determine the definition of those interests by providing prescriptive foreign 
policy goals (Berger 1998: 16-19). 
The closeness between strategic culture and a sense of national self-image or identity,  
makes it likely that any infringement of accepted norms or any abandonment of culturally 
                                                     
5
 See for instance, Paul Cornish, and Geoffrey Edwards (2001) “Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: the beginning of a 
European Strategic Culture” International Affairs, 77(3): 587-603; Sten Rynning (2003) “The European Union: Towards a 
Strategic Culture?” Security Dialogue 34(4): 479-49; and Asle Toje (2008) America, the EU and Strategic Culture. New York: 
Routledge. 
20 
 
prescribed national goals will provoke domestic opposition that is both strong and emotional 
since such norms and goals are closely linked to a basic sense of national identity (Berger 
1998: 21). Culture also dictates strategic behavior in the international system by shaping the 
preferences, perceptions and beliefs of a given nation’s citizens. By adhering to a state’s 
unique, deep-rooted cultural assumptions, each state is predisposed toward certain strategic 
choices and policies while rendering others inconsiderable (Dueck 2006: 15-16). Once 
institutionalized in the society, strategic culture constrains and limits the range of options, 
tactics, and policies that are accessible to policymakers as they shape the solutions to 
problems (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 20-24). 
Theories that favor domestic variables argue that internal factors such as political and 
economic ideology, national character, partisan politics, or socioeconomic structure decide 
state behavior, and foreign policy is to be interpreted as a product of these internal 
dynamics. Following this perspective, the preferences and structures of key domestic actors 
should be reviewed to understand why a particular state is behaving in a particular way. The 
main obstacle to this approach is that it does not offer an explanation for divergent behavior 
from states with similar domestic structures, or similar behavior from dissimilar states. 
Realist theories on the other hand, have a clear emphasis on the international level where 
security is scarce and states try to secure their own interests by maximizing their relative 
advantage (Rose 1998: 148-149) 
John Mearsheimer (as quoted in Rose 1998: 149) and other offensive realist note that states 
pursuing security often are forced to take actions to expand their relative power which can 
lead to conflict with other states because of the structure of the international system. 
Realists do not pay much attention to the internal differences between states. They argue 
that an examination of a state’s relative capabilities and its external environment will explain 
its foreign policy behavior as these factors shape how the state chooses to advance its 
interests. While they assume the pressure from the international system to be strong 
enough to make states in similar situations behave alike regardless of their domestic 
characteristics, realist theories are often oversimplified as states with similar structure do 
not always behave similarly (Rose 1998: 148-149). 
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2.2.3 Neoclassical realism 
 
An alternative to cultural and power-based theories of strategic adjustment can be found in 
neoclassical realism. In recent years, several realists have sought to reduce the gap between 
power and culture, and the tendency to include domestic-level factors when explaining 
foreign policy behavior has increased. This neoclassical realist approach is based on the 
classical realist assumption that state behavior first and foremost is explained by systemic 
factors such as its position in the international system, its relative material power 
capabilities, or international pressures or threats. But what separates them from classical 
realists is the notion that international systemic factors have an indirect impact on foreign 
policy and it is important to examine the contexts within which foreign policies are 
formulated and implemented.  
In other words, intervening domestic-level factors are included to produce greater predictive 
and empirical precision in foreign policy analysis. Because the formulation of foreign policy 
lies in the hands of political leaders, state institutions and elites within a society, it is their 
perceptions of relative power that are emphasized rather than simply the actual quantities 
of resources or forces. Gideon Rose (1998: 147) also points out that policymakers do not 
always have the opportunity to allocate resources according to their wishes because the 
strength and structure of states relative to their societies may affect the proportion of 
national resources that can be used for foreign policy purposes (Rose 1998: 146-147; Dueck 
2006: 18). 
How can the neoclassical realist approach be useful when explaining changes in grand 
strategy? First, it begins with the fact that the international system is the most important 
overall cause of strategic behavior and that the dominant factor shaping foreign policies 
over time is a state’s relative material power compared with the rest of the international 
system. This would suggest that change in grand strategy is motivated by changes in the 
international distribution of power and/or changes in a state’s perceived level of external 
threat. If a state achieves more power or face greater threats from abroad, neoclassical 
realists assume that states will respond by seeking to control and shape their external 
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environment and seek more influence abroad through a more costly and expansive grand 
strategy. Accordingly, if a state face a relative decline in power and fewer threats, their 
actions and ambitions will be scaled back and they will adopt a less costly and less expansive 
grand strategy (Rose 1998: 150-152; Dueck 2006: 18-19).  
Second, the neoclassical realist approach will argue that one cannot rely solely on systemic 
factors in foreign policy analysis. To comprehend the manner in which states interpret and 
respond to their external environment, it is important to understand how the systemic 
factors are translated through a cultural process by intervening variables at the domestic 
level. As mentioned earlier, neoclassical realists finds systemic factors to have an indirect 
impact on foreign policy and considers that, it must be filtered through the perceptions and 
preferences of a state’s policymakers to have explanatory power. This proposes that culture 
can predispose a state toward certain strategic choices, thus limiting the range of acceptable 
policy alternatives in a given situation. According to this approach, the international system 
and the global distribution of power can only guide foreign policy by affecting decisions 
taken by policymakers. This makes it important to explore how each state’s officials perceive 
their current situation in order to understand how cultural factors can help specify and 
explain the final choices they make (Rose 1998: 152, 157-160; Dueck 2006: 19). 
The second intervening variable is the strength of a country’s state apparatus and the 
relation it has to its society and citizens. Governments and national leaders may not have 
easy access to the nation’s total material power resources; foreign policy analysis must 
therefore take into account the need for new domestic support to allocate necessary 
resources and for any new departures in grand strategy. As such, how ideas are generated, 
debated, adopted, communicated by policymakers and political leaders to their public 
through a discursive political process, is key to understanding both change and continuity in 
policy choice (Schmidt 2011: 57-58).  
Colin Dueck (2006: 19) also highlights the importance of domestic support considering that 
such changes must be politically feasible and legitimate at home before they can be 
implemented abroad. The concept of national political power, which Thomas Christensen (as 
cited in Rose 1998: 163) has defined as «the ability of state leaders to mobilize their nation’s 
human and material resources behind security policy initiatives», acts as an important 
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intervening variable between the challenges states face from the international system and 
the strategies they follow in order to meet them (Rose 1998: 161-164). 
Policymakers, who in some way violate cultural preferences and expectations when 
formulating a country’s grand strategy, risk their own political support, as well as the success 
of their chosen policies. Anticipating potential reactions creates strong political incentives to 
frame choices and new strategic initiatives in terms that are culturally acceptable and in 
accordance with cultural preferences. In fact, policymakers may also share, come to share, 
or even shape the cultural preferences and perceptions held by their constituents, especially 
if they are closely linked to a sense of national identity (Dueck 2006: 19). 
The theoretical framework presented by neoclassical realist thus integrates insights from 
both constructivism (ideas/culture) and discursive institutionalism (national discourse) to the 
realm of realism to include domestic-level factors when explaining adjustment in policy 
choice. This can be summarized as in the following figure, showing how domestic-level 
factors act as filters through which the systemic factors are translated into strategic choice.  
 
 
Figure 2.3. The neoclassical realist framework of strategic choice 
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3 American exceptionalism and U.S. grand 
strategy 
 
When applying the neoclassical realist framework to the case of the United States, Colin 
Dueck (2006: 21) argues that features that are unique for the United States and American 
society represent an important part of the structural basis for the formulation of U.S. grand 
strategy. 
Any study of change in American grand strategy that incorporates cultural factors is required 
to specify the cultural traits that are unique to the United States. Accordingly, the factors 
that are related to an American national identity and strategic culture have to be examined 
to understand its decisive influence on how changes in grand strategy are expressed 
politically. Hilde Restad (2012: 53) asserts that the domestic idea about the nature of the 
country the United States has a profound effect on its foreign policy, and that in the United 
States this predominant idea can be summarized in the phenomenon American 
exceptionalism. Svein Melby (1995: 20) also notes that this exceptionalism contains 
elements that are of great importance to the United States and its choice of strategy as it 
underlies the American perception of its external environment. 
 
3.1 American strategic culture 
 
The idea of an American national style is derivative from the idea of American strategic 
culture, suggesting that there is a distinctively American way in strategic matters (Gray 1981: 
22). 
 
American foreign policy reflects a long tradition of tension between idealism and realism. 
The synthesis of realism and idealism has historically manifested itself in the foreign policy 
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traditions of the United States, and led to an ebb and flow between strategies of restraint 
and assertiveness. Therefore, it is necessary to comprehend the nature of this synthesis in 
order to understand the formulation of American foreign policy (Osgood 1953) 
Halle (1960: 110) summarizes this view by stating that the juxtaposition between ideals and 
national interests «appears to epitomize the dilemma and the paradox of American foreign 
policy».  Condoleezza Rice’s (20076) use of the term American realism when describing the 
Bush administration’s foreign policy can be seen as a concrete example of this reconciliation. 
She further characterized this term with the following phrase: « [w]e will never bring our 
day-to-day interests into perfect harmony with our ideals. But that is a challenge for policy, 
not a license to ignore our principles». 
Colin Dueck (2006: 21) distinguishes between two dominant features of the United States’ 
traditional strategic culture; the first being the relative weight of classical liberal 
assumptions within American strategic thinking, and the second, a historical and intense 
preference for limited liability in strategic affairs.  The history of American grand strategy is a 
history of reluctant crusaders. These two features of American strategic culture have 
operated cyclically as well as simultaneously between the promotion of a more liberal 
international order and the reluctance to admit the full costs of promoting this liberal vision 
(ibid: 3). 
Americans define their national identity according to a classic liberal set of beliefs that 
accentuate individual freedom, equality of right, majority rule, progress, enterprise, the rule 
of law, and the strict limits of the state. The importance of liberalism in the United States is 
most likely connected to material conditions such as plentiful land, a predominant middle 
class, and the recurrent need to integrate new immigrants from a variety of backgrounds 
(Hartz 1955: 4-11; Lipset 1996: 31-52). It has been reinterpreted over time, but the liberal 
tradition has remained important in shaping American strategic culture. This tradition 
assumes that progress in international affairs is possible, and does not simply understand 
international relations as a cycle of conflict, war and balance-of-power politics (Dueck 2006: 
21). 
                                                     
6
 Article published in The Washington Post without page numbers. 
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The second characteristic of American strategic culture is the assumptions of limited liability 
which can be defined as «a culturally shaped preference for avoiding costs and 
commitments in grand strategy, to an extent that is actually inconsistent with stated and 
established international goals» (Dueck 2006: 26). This has affected U.S. grand strategy in 
two ways throughout history. First, it has meant that the United States often takes on a 
smaller role in international affairs than expected considering its position in the world and its 
considerable material power. Secondly, it encourages a disjuncture between ends and 
means in its foreign policy as it seeks to pursue foreign policy goals with limited means. 
This feature seems to be rooted in a combination of historical, geopolitical, institutional, and 
cultural factors. The preference for limited liability was eventually overturned by immense 
international pressures when the United States entered World War II, but it still has a strong 
and independent effect on U.S strategic behavior today. Historically, strategies of non-
entanglement and disengagement have been favored by Americans, and the country’s 
unique geopolitical position, the separation from any other major military power by two 
great oceans, has created a mindset that does not see the necessity for costly, long-term 
commitments overseas. 
The American political system also tends to act as a constraint to a more expansive grand 
strategy. It was created to resist dramatic policy changes and the challenge to mobilize 
public and legislative support for costly international initiatives is hard to overcome as the 
United States’ federal government is fragmented, decentralized and constrained by the 
power division between the president and Congress. Finally, assumptions of limited liability 
are implicit within the classical liberal tradition that informs American strategic culture. 
While liberal ideas can encourage the use of military force to achieve strategic goals, the 
tendency is toward a peaceful, democratic international system. Even though short-term 
military intervention sometimes may be necessary to meet international threats, economic 
and diplomatic means are preferred by liberalists (Dueck 2006: 27-30). 
The classical liberal assumptions have acted as a filter on potential policy options in the 
United States, allowing certain strategic alternatives while rendering others unthinkable. At 
the same time, the tradition of limited liability in matters of grand strategy has influenced 
Americans to limit costs of overseas commitments. The first part of American strategic 
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culture will often encourage U.S. officials to define American goals in idealistic, expansive, 
and global terms, whilst the other will discourage Americans from making concrete sacrifices 
toward that liberal vision. Former Secretary of State George Shultz (as quoted in Kissinger 
2014: 329):  
Americans, being a moral people, want their foreign policy to reflect the values we espouse 
as a nation. But Americans, being a practical people, also want their foreign policy to be 
effective. 
 
Domestic cultural forces tend to constrain U.S. strategic behavior abroad and pull it in a 
more liberal direction, while international conditions tend to stimulate American 
involvement overseas often leading to unwanted compromise on its liberal principles. The 
result is a persistent tug of war between international pressures and American strategic 
culture (Dueck 2006; Schmidt 2011). The fundamental goals of U.S. foreign policy, the 
promotion and protection of democracy and liberal values to build a more peaceful world 
order and the maintenance of global stability to protect national interests and domestic 
security are deeply rooted in American history and in its national identity. To achieve these 
goals, the ideals and national interests of the United States has to be reconciled in a manner 
that makes it in America’s national interest to protect the idealistic values it represents 
(Osgood 1953; Melby 1995). 
 
3.2 The sources of American Exceptionalism 
 
According to Jonathan Monten (2005: 119), the American political identity is expressed in 
foreign policy primarily through the idea of American exceptionalism. Deborah Madsen’s 
(1998: 1-3) main argument is that American exceptionalism affects every period of American 
history and «is the single most powerful agent in a series of arguments that have been 
fought down through the centuries concerning the identity of America and Americans». 
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3.2.1 An exceptional national identity 
 
The question “who are we?” is important for the American people. Since the nation is 
composed of people from every corner of the world, the issue of roots, origins and national 
identity becomes an essential and complex one for most Americans (Moen 2005: 11). 
Political scientist Samuel Huntington (1997: 28) argued in Foreign Affairs that: «national 
interests derive from national identity. We have to know who we are before we know what 
our interests are». Sociologist Anthony Smith (2003: 24-25) further defines national identity 
as the «maintenance and continual re-interpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, 
memories, myths, and traditions that form the distinctive heritage of the nation and the 
identification of individuals with that heritage and its pattern». 
Even though the history of the United States is quite short, Americans are highly aware of 
their unique past and the nation regards itself as different, exceptional and unlike any other 
nation. The American national identity is not grounded in ethnicity, language, race, skin 
color, or a long common history as is the traditional sense of belonging in the Old World 
(Moen 2005: 11-16). Americans rather define themselves and their unity based on a shared 
belief in a set of universal ideas and principles dating back to the Founding of America: 
liberty, equality, democracy, constitutionalism, liberalism, individualism, and limited 
government. These ideas and principles represent the American Creed, and are, by foreign 
observers of the United States from Crèvecoeur to Tocqueville and Bryce7, to the present, 
widely viewed as a fundamental basis of American identity. In the words of President Barack 
Obama (2011): 
We may have differences in policy, but we all believe in the rights enshrined in our 
Constitution. We may have different opinions, but we believe in the same promise that says 
this is a place where you can make it if you try. We may have different backgrounds, but we 
believe in the same dream that says this is a country where anything is possible. No matter 
who you are. No matter where you come from. 
                                                     
7
J. Hector St. John Crèvecoeur (1791/1904) “What Is an American?” Letter 3 in Letters from an American Farmer. New York: 
Fox, Duffield; Alexis de Tocqueville (1835/2010) Democracy in America. Ed. J. P. Mayer. New York: Perennial Classics; James 
Bryce (1887) The Predictions of Hamilton and de Tocqueville. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.  
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Hilde Restad (2015: 2-3) argues that American exceptionalism is a meaningful way of 
defining the elusive category of American identity. By doing this, exceptionalism is treated as 
a subjective self-understanding that is made up of three important ideas that explain 
America’s role in the world. Each idea represents a different aspect of the perceived historic 
significance of the United States and inspires a certain kind of foreign policy. First is the idea 
that the United States is distinct from the Old World; second, that it has a special and unique 
role to play in world history; and third, that the United States will resist the historic notion 
that all great powers eventually fall. These three aspects have important consequences for 
how the United States relates to the rest of the world (McCrisken 2003: 8-10). 
The first aspect of American exceptionalism is classified by Restad (2015: 3) as “the 
distinction” and summarized by Byron Shafer (1991: v) as: «the notion that the United States 
was created differently, developed differently, and thus has to be understood differently — 
essentially on its own terms and within its own context». The United States of America was 
founded upon and developed from a set of ideas and beliefs from the Age of Enlightenment. 
Accordingly, American exceptionalism as a national identity is not an objective truth, it 
rather represents a self-understanding or a self-image that is so special that it not only 
makes Americans different from the rest of the world, and it makes them better and more 
unique (McCrisken 2003: 8).  
The American identity reflects a strong belief in the ideas of «life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness» (Declaration of Independence 1776), and it believes that the United States is 
freer, more individualistic, more democratic, and more open and dynamic than any other 
nation. It represents a society based on openness where Americans are equal and have the 
same opportunities, unlike the Old Europe and its class-based system where you are born 
into your destiny (Halle 1960: 7-8). These exceptional qualities of the United States have 
roots that date back to the British Puritans’ arrival to the American colonies in 1620 and the 
Founding of the United States of America.   
According to Restad (2015: 4): «if one does not believe that American exceptionalism means 
better rather than different, one’s Americanness is open to questioning». This is partly due 
to the cultural heritage, the nation’s history and the unique way the American national 
identity has developed over time. As expressed in Thomas Paine’s (as quoted in Monten 
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2005: 113) dedication of The Rights of Man where he wrote that the United States was 
founded to see «the New World regenerate the Old», American exceptionalism involves the 
belief that the founding of the United States inaugurated a new era in world history, where a 
completely new and different political entity entered the world stage. This belief in U.S. 
distinction from the rest of the world is powerful, persistent, pervasive and as alive today as 
it was in early U.S. history (Madsen 1998; Deneen 2012: 30). 
The second aspect can be defined as “the mission”, or the premise that American 
exceptionalism endows the United States with a unique role to play in world history. 
Jonathan Monten (2005: 119) argues that American identity «has been organized around a 
particular conception of the national purpose, expressed in foreign policy as the belief that 
Americans are “a chosen people”, an elect nation guided by a “special providence” to 
demonstrate the viability and spread the democratic institutions and values that inform the 
American experiment». The mission to advance American ideals and values has been fairly 
constant in U.S. grand strategy and has helped frame presidential discourse on foreign policy 
projects from the 1776 Revolution to President Obama’s case for military intervention in 
Syria. This special role involves two tasks for the United States; the advancement of America 
as a model for the rest of the world and the promotion of American leadership (McCrisken 
2003: 8; Kristol 2013: 100; Restad 2015: 5-6). 
The resistance of America’s great power status is a powerful idea in the United States, and 
represents the third aspect of American exceptionalism. The belief that the United States 
can surpass the historic notion and avoid the same fate as other great empires of the past, 
that is a fall into ruin, links exceptionalism to the continued growth of the country 
(McCrisken 2003: 10). This aspect of American exceptionalism has seemingly been 
vindicated, and according to Restad (2015: 6): «the United States had proven itself to be that 
special nation that shall lead all other nationals toward the “end of history” after the Cold 
War». 
American exceptionalism represents an idealized self-understanding of the United States. 
Because of its strong presence in American society, the maintenance of an active 
international role and foreign policy course over time will be determined by the extent to 
which this self-image can be preserved. Changes in the American self-understanding can 
31 
 
cause considerable reactions and even lead to a restructuring and adjustment of the nation’s 
grand strategy. This makes American exceptionalism crucial to the general course of U.S. 
foreign policy, and it represents a distinctive characteristic that separates the formulation of 
American grand strategy from other states. It also contributes to a degree of uncertainty 
when it comes to American commitment in international affairs. This is emphasized when 
examining the deeper foundations of American exceptionalism and its two principal 
approaches to foreign policy (Melby 1995: 21-22). 
 
3.2.2 The varieties of American exceptionalism 
 
The exceptional national identity that Americans have ascribed themselves is, in both classic 
as well as contemporary literature on U.S. foreign policy, said to have produced two 
divergent foreign policy approaches8. Henry Kissinger (1994: 18) finds two contradictory 
attitudes in how the United States conceives its international role: «America as beacon and 
America as crusader». While both attitudes are products of the American experience and 
envision an international world order based on democracy, free commerce and international 
law, their perspective on how America should behave in the world.  
The first attitude is an exemplary approach in which America as a “Promised Land” serves its 
values best by perfecting democracy at home and acting as a beacon for the rest of the 
world. Meanwhile, the second holds that America as a “Crusader State” is called upon to 
save the world, and that America’s values impose on it an obligation to crusade for these 
values around the world (Kissinger 1994: 18; McDougall 1997: 5). Anthony Smith (2003: 93) 
identifies the same dichotomy, distinguishing between “covenanted peoples” who «turn 
inward away from the profane world» and “missionary peoples” who «seek to expand into 
and transform the world». Accordingly, the exemplary and the missionary approach are 
                                                     
8
 See for instance, Ernest Lee Tuveson (1968) Redeemer Nation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Svein Melby (1995) 
Amerikansk utenrikspolitikk. Oslo: TANO; Walter A. McDougall (1997) Promised Land, Crusader State. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin; H.W. Brands (1998) What America Owes the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Trevor McCrisken 
(2003) American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; and Colin Dueck (2006) 
Reluctant Crusaders. Princeton University Press: Princeton. 
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bound together by the concept of American exceptionalism as both have roots in the same 
political and religious sources (McCrisken 2002: 64–65). 
An exemplary identity 
 
Since the arrival of the British Puritans to the American colonies with the Mayflower in 1620, 
the United States has represented a haven for the deserving, a new beginning for the 
persecuted of the Old World, and for people seeking the social and economic mobility that 
the United States can offer. To them, the United States represented a sanctuary from the 
Old World and its restrained political, economic and religious systems — the United States 
offered the “sense of escape” (Halle 1960: 13-15).  
The United States was founded in separation from the politics of the Old World and its 
balance-of-power system. The overall goal was to build a new societal system and to protect 
this unique experiment from the ideas and influences of the Old World. In order to ensure 
this, U.S. participation in world affairs had to be kept at a minimum. Any entanglement with 
the Old World and its great power politics could jeopardize American core values. Alexander 
Hamilton encouraged this approach to America’s role in the world, arguing that the United 
States should not take on the burden of other people’s problems considering their own 
domestic troubles (Brands 1998: 3). The approach contends that the United States can 
«better serve the cause of universal democracy by setting an example rather than by 
imposing a model» (Mead 2002: 182). 
Keeping the rest of the world at an arm’s length and appearing as “a city upon a hill” 
entailed that American institutions and values should be perfected and preserved, and that 
the United States should exert influence on the world through the force of its example. The 
United States should shine its example throughout the Old World, but not engage directly 
with it (Brands 1998: viii, 3-4). According to this view, the United States should remain 
somewhat detached from international politics and alliances, and follow a non-
interventionist strategy regarding military conflicts overseas, to best serve and secure 
American interests and promote political change internationally. The exemplary aspect of 
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exceptionalism sets strict limitations to the level of engagement in American foreign policy. 
While it may contain an element of active engagement in the world, it only does so after the 
spread of American values has contributed to significant change in the international order 
(Dueck 2006: 23). 
Even if the sense of escape approach was most prominent in early periods of American 
history, and its explanatory power weakened since World War II, it still represents an 
important part of American foreign policy debate. The reluctance and misalignment that has 
characterized the American role as a superpower gives credit to the continued existence of 
this perspective. While traditional great powers would naturally take a leadership role and 
exploit its position in the system, the United States has on several occasions seemed 
reluctant and unwilling to participate to its fullest potential, allowing allies to contribute and 
lead to a larger extent than the actual power balance would suggest. This has actually 
contributed to a stronger international position for the United States than clear power 
politics would have, because this approach to foreign policy has given them more credibility 
and a higher level of trust in the international system than any other traditional great power 
(Melby 1995: 23-24). 
A missionary identity 
 
The second perspective shares the “city on a hill” identity, but argues that the United States 
must move beyond example and undertake active measures to spread its universal political 
values and institutions to the world (Brands 1998: viii, 6). While the exemplary approach is 
introverted and defensive in its origin, the missionary perspective is built on the belief that 
the United States can only uphold the demands and expectations of exceptionalism through 
an outward-looking and offensive foreign policy. Engagement in world affairs and an active 
foreign policy is key to securing American overall foreign policy goals and protecting the 
American idealistic societal system.  
Followers of this perspective see it as «an American duty to remake the world in its image» 
(Mead 2002: 147). Through an active American foreign policy, the international system shall 
34 
 
find ideological harmonization in the American image which, following classic idealist theory 
represents the path toward an international system without conflict. This perspective is seen 
as interventionist in its strategy, but to classical liberal ends. The main goal is to remove 
authoritarian governments throughout the world, and remake the international system in 
America’s image to secure the American experiment (Dueck 2006: 23).  
The “manifest destiny” approach has played a major role in American foreign policy history, 
and it created the ideological and legitimizing basis for the territorial expansion of the 
United States in the 1800s (Brands 1998: 9-11). The journalist John L. Sullivan is said to have 
coined the term manifest destiny in 1845, and described its goal as «to overspread the 
continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying 
millions» (Sullivan as quoted in Restad 2015: 38). According to Sullivan, Providence had 
designated North America as the stage for demonstrating the larger course of history, and 
armed with this divine mandate, the United States could legitimize their territorial expansion 
as a manifest of their destiny. Clearly, the connection between religion and idealism is an 
important one for the American people and their exceptional national identity. This is 
substantiated by the fact that although the term manifest destiny was coined in 1845, the 
mindset leads back to the Puritan tradition.  
 
3.2.3 The influence of American exceptionalism on U.S. foreign policy 
 
As scholars agree that each of the approaches are connected to a foreign policy dichotomy 
between isolationism and internationalism, American exceptionalism involves a substantial 
potential for adjustments, fluctuations and inner conflict with regard to the nature and 
extent of international engagement in American foreign policy. Former Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger (1994: 17) states in Diplomacy that American foreign policy and its 
accompanying rhetoric has always had at its heart a tension between those who would 
argue that: «America serves its values best by perfecting democracy at home, thereby acting 
as a beacon for the rest of mankind» with those that maintain that: «America’s values 
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impose on it an obligation to crusade for them around the world».  Proponents of these two 
divergent approaches to U.S. foreign policy are known as exemplarists and internationalists. 
The exemplary identity is said to inspire an isolationist foreign policy which entails that the 
United States should be reluctant to involve itself with the outside world, and nurture its 
own political experiment. Meanwhile, the internationalist foreign policy, inspired by the 
missionary approach, means an active engagement in world affairs, acting out the world 
historic mission Americans has been given (Restad 2015: 7). This issue has taken a variety of 
shapes and forms throughout the years; from whether the United States should remain 
neutral in war times, to whether the United States should or should not become an 
imperialistic power with colonial possessions overseas. It also takes the form of a question as 
to whether or not the United States has a duty to liberate the enslaved or oppressed peoples 
of the world — a question that remains as relevant in the current world order. In addition, 
this issue has shaped the direction of American foreign policy — whether to look across the 
Atlantic to Europe or across the Pacific, look south toward Latin America or to find strategic 
allies in the Middle East (Halle 1960: 2).  
One can find several illustrations of the tension between these two approaches throughout 
the course of American history. One example can be found in the foreign policies of Thomas 
Jefferson. His extension to the Pacific is seen as reflecting an expansionist impulse, while his 
deployment of marines to battle Barbary pirates in Tripoli is often connected with 
unilateralism and militarism; his reluctance to build stronger diplomatic ties with Europe is 
sometimes linked with isolationism; and his attempts to create an international commercial 
system favorable to the U.S. economy is associated with liberal internationalism (Tomes 
2014: 33). 
Another example is Woodrow Wilson’s turnaround in U.S. policy toward World War I, from a 
strict exemplary argument in 1915 to advocating a greater international role and U.S. 
engagement two years later. Parts of the Wilsonian presidential period can be regarded as a 
peak for the missionary perspective’s influence on foreign policy. His mission to make the 
world “safe for democracy” and to create a more peaceful world order, were key objectives 
for Wilsonian grand strategy. Both his arguments for American engagement in World War I 
in 1917 and his commitment to the League of Nations after the war was largely based on 
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core elements of the missionary approach: that the United States through active 
engagement in the world would end the dominating position of classic power politics and 
lead the way towards an international system rooted in self-determination and American 
values (Mead 2002: 162-167). 
The idealism of the missionary approach has been prominent in the internationalization of 
American foreign policy since the 1940s. America emerged from World War II as the most 
powerful nation — militarily, economically and politically. As such, it created a new world 
order and a system of political and economic institutions in its own image. American 
exceptionalism also created the foundation for a variety of foreign policy doctrines: from the 
containment policy of the Cold War, via U.S. engagement in Vietnam, to the idealistic 
policies during Reagan’s presidency. Reagan was among the most successful presidents in 
combining a sense of American exceptionalism with a duty to lead (Tomes 2014: 40). This 
strain of exceptionalism dominated American thinking until the end of the Cold War. 
The end of the Cold War provided an opportunity for a complete reorientation of America’s 
role in the world. However, the overall grand strategy of the United States has remained 
relatively stable since, albeit with significant adjustments by each of the past three 
administrations. Some version of primacy has guided American grand strategy since the 
1940s (Mayer 2014: 6). With the fall of the Soviet Union and the lack of a peer competitor in 
the international system, the United States could, for instance, have attempted a strategic 
disengagement. Either by reducing their commitments to alliances and partners overseas 
and pulling back military forces abroad or by turning to an approach based on balancing 
powers in Europe and Asia by maintaining a military presence in strategic regions.  
Instead, the Clinton administration decided to follow a grand strategy of “liberal 
internationalism” based on democratic enlargement, multilateralism, humanitarian 
intervention, democracy promotion. As a result, there has been broad bipartisan domestic 
support for an active and military focused grand strategy since the 1990s and any strategic 
alternatives seeking to reduce the American hegemony and presence in the world were not 
taken into consideration. George W. Bush came to power in 2001 with a strategic vision 
based on less liberal internationalist assumptions than Clinton. He wanted to be more 
selective concerning military interventions overseas. But then the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
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created the foundation for another, more assertive, shift in grand strategy towards the 
neoconservative doctrine of democracy promotion. George W. Bush (2004) defended this 
policy by describing it as a «deep desire to spread liberty around the world as a way to help 
secure our country in the long run». 
Accordingly, one can ascertain that American exceptionalism provides the idealistic 
foundation for two fundamentally different formulations of foreign policy. It also contains a 
latent instability issue since policies can change relatively quickly from a version of 
isolationism to missionary internationalism. This highlights the potential of American 
exceptionalism to influence and/or change foreign policy course, and the polarization this 
exceptionalism creates remains an important issue in American foreign policy debate. The 
prominent role of American exceptionalism in the 2012 presidential election clearly 
illustrates this point. As Scott Wilson (2012) of The Washington Post notes, both President 
Obama and Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney shared the belief that: «American 
political and economic values should triumph in the world». However, Romney, a clear 
proponent of American exceptionalism, consistently called for a tougher approach to the 
world, emphasizing «rewarding traditional allies while punishing rather than cultivating 
difficult nations». While Obama, on the other hand, emphasized diplomacy and 
partnerships, and «American assistance where wanted without heavy-handed demands 
from the top». 
While the manner in which this liberal international order has been promoted has changed 
as the world changes, the core concept still endures. America’s role in the world and its 
responsibility is to promote and defend freedom and democracy. This is the grand liberal 
vision of US foreign policy, and it is present in both of the aforementioned approaches. Even 
though they differ in choice of strategy and tactics, they both contain strong elements of 
idealism and are founded in the classic liberal assumptions. 
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4 Methodological framework 
 
The previous two chapters constitute the analytical, theoretical and conceptual 
underpinning for this study. However, before conducting the analysis, it is also of importance 
to discuss some methodological considerations and present the framework through which 
the research question will be examined.  
 
4.1 Indicators of American exceptionalism 
 
The previous chapter offered a theoretical and conceptual definition of American 
exceptionalism as a sense of self based on a shared belief in a set of universal, liberal-
democratic values and ideas. It constitutes a distinct belief that the United States is unique, 
if not superior to other nations. Because of its national credo, historical development and 
remarkable origins, America is seen as a special nation with a special role to play in the world 
throughout history. The belief in American exceptionalism is a fundamental, perhaps even 
primary, characteristic of both American strategic culture and national identity. In order to 
examine the research question of this thesis, the concept of American exceptionalism must 
be operationalized (Adcock and Collier 2001: 531). 
Seymour M. Lipset (1996: 26) stated that America «is the most religious, optimistic, patriotic, 
rights-oriented, and individualistic» country in the world. It is the only nation in the world 
that is founded on a creed, as reflected in the U.S. Constitution and The Declaration of 
Independence: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness (Declaration of Independence 1776) 
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This was further highlighted by President Obama (2015b) in his remarks at the 50th 
Anniversary of the Selma to Montgomery Marches: 
For we were born of change. We broke the old aristocracies, declaring ourselves entitled not 
by bloodline, but endowed by our Creator with certain inalienable rights.  We secure our 
rights and responsibilities through a system of self-government, of and by and for the people.  
That’s why we argue and fight with so much passion and conviction -- because we know our 
efforts matter.  We know America is what we make of it. 
 
These quotes represent the religious, political, and secular sources of American 
exceptionalism. The United States was founded in separation from the anciens régimes of 
Europe, and it combined two powerful ideas of exceptionalism: the Reformation idea of 
America as a religious exemplar and the Enlightenment idea of America as a political 
harbinger for the rest of the world (Restad 2015: 28). These two ideas are bound together by 
the concept of American exceptionalism and share the same roots (McCrisken 2002). These 
roots can be traced back to the British settlers who to traveled to the American colonies to 
establish a new societal system. The settlers mostly came from lower-middle-class England, 
and left the Old World to escape its restrained political, economic and religious systems, and 
to embrace the opportunities that America could offer.  
Samuel Huntington (2004) contends that these Anglo-Protestant roots are at the core of 
mainstream culture in the United States, and argues that almost all the central ideas of the 
American identity have their origins in dissenting Protestant culture. He further states that:  
Protestant emphasis on the individual conscience and the responsibility of individuals to 
learn God’s truths directly from the Bible promoted American commitment to individualism, 
equality, and the rights to freedom of religion and opinion. Protestantism stressed the work 
ethic and the responsibility of the individual for his own success or failure in life. With its 
congregational forms of church organization, Protestantism fostered opposition to hierarchy 
and the assumption that similar democratic forms should be employed in government (ibid: 
68) 
 
The Anglo-Protestant culture constitutes the foundation of America’s liberal ideas, values 
and beliefs that informs the concept of American exceptionalism. One might, therefore, 
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extract different attributes of the American society and its national identity as indicators of 
this greater phenomenon. The value of Protestantism on American identity creates grounds 
for a deeper examination of the current importance of religion in America, thus religiosity is 
selected as a pillar of exceptionalism. Religion has prominently shaped American views of its 
place in the world due to the belief that the United States was endowed with a special 
blessing from God. The sense of uniqueness in America’s self-image also reflected a belief 
that the natural rights and blessings Americans enjoyed were God-given. The exceptional 
narrative provides the United States with a unique duty and special mission to transform the 
world, which makes America, inherently, a force for good  
Social and economic mobility is also considered an important aspect of American 
exceptionalism with reference to the strong belief in individualism, equality of rights and 
opportunities, and the value of meritocratic factors such as ability, effort and ambition. The 
final indicator chosen for this thesis is patriotism. It represents the outward manifestation of 
the domestic foundation of American exceptionalism and Americans views on the global role 
for the United States. It entails the moralism and idealism in foreign policy; the promotion of 
liberal values such as democracy and human rights to the rest of the world.  
These three indicators are assumed to represent essential features of the American sense of 
self and to significantly shape and influence the way the United States conducts itself in the 
world. They will be utilized as the indicators through which trends in American 
exceptionalism can be identified.  
Religiosity 
 
The United States is often referred to as a “blessed nation” set apart by Providence, and 
endowed with a “special mission” as the leader of the Free World. Ever since the Puritans 
came to America, this idea has been embraced by the American people and it constitutes a 
decisive feature and a core pillar of American exceptionalism. The religious roots of 
American exceptionalism are well-established, and the belief that American exceptionalism 
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is largely an ongoing and unbroken manifestation of America’s Puritan founding is a long-
standing consensus view (Deneen 2012:30).  
Alexis de Tocqueville noted in Democracy in America (1835 [2010]: 473) that: «America is 
still the place in the world where the Christian religion has most retained true power over 
souls». In his book, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword, Seymour Martin Lipset 
(1996: 18-19) quoted Karl Marx calling America «preeminently the country of religiosity». 
Lipset himself shared this belief stating that the United States has been «the most religious 
country in Christendom», and that it has exhibited greater acceptance of biblical beliefs and 
higher levels of church attendance than the rest of the world. For Tocqueville (1835 [2010]), 
religiosity was necessary in a democratic country, as it gave the people a moral language to 
restrict the unimpeded longings of individualism. 
The Founders arranged for a separation between church and state, yet Americans have a 
strong inclination to intertwine religion with politics (Dunn 2013: 5-6). Even though the 
United States does not have an established church or an official state religion, Christianity 
plays a fundamental and partisan role in U.S. politics. To give one example, that the closing 
remarks of American presidents addresses to the nation is the words “God Bless America” is 
widely accepted in the United States, whilst in Western European countries this would most 
likely have been unpopular as the role of religion often is separated from politics and 
considered a part of one’s private life. 
Patriotism 
 
This indicator represents an essential part of the American Creed, as it reassures the 
American people that the United States, as a force of human good, will lead the world in its 
image. The “special mission” that God has endowed upon America as the leader of the Free 
World accentuates the belief that the United States has a unique role to play in world 
history. In the words of Mitt Romney (2011): 
We are a people who, in the language of our Declaration of Independence, hold certain 
truths to be self-evident: namely, that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain 
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unalienable rights. It is our belief in the universality of these unalienable rights that leads us 
to our exceptional role on the world stage, that of a great champion of human dignity and 
human freedom. 
 
William Kristol (2013: 100) identifies American exceptionalism as America’s special 
responsibility or destiny to defend and promote the universal ideals. In this sense, American 
patriotism is «the patriotism of universal principles». This is further described by Heclo 
(2013: 36) as «a patriotism that loves America not only because it is your particular 
homeland, but also because you cherish the universal principles that it represents for 
everyone’s homeland». Americans continue to be proud of their nation, to exhibit a greater 
sense of patriotism and of belief that their system is superior to all others, regardless of 
evidence that might indicate otherwise (Lipset 1996: 51).  
It is worth addressing that conclusions derived from measuring patriotism through indicators 
of willingness to military intervention and global engagement, as the forthcoming analysis 
will seek to do, can constitute a difficult analytical problem as public opinion often can 
reflect changing sentiments rather than real changes in the society. Accordingly, it is 
important to take context into consideration to avoid such misinterpretation.  
Economic mobility 
 
For more than two centuries, economic opportunity and the prospect of upward mobility 
have formed the bedrock upon which the American story has been anchored — inspiring 
people in distant lands to seek our shores and sustaining the unwavering optimism of 
Americans at home (Sawhill and Morton 2007:1). 
 
Economic mobility can be defined as «the ability of people to move up or down the 
economic ladder within a lifetime or from one generation to the next» (Sawhill and Monton 
2007: 1). From the arrival of the British Puritans to the American colonies in 1620 to the 
hopes and aspirations of today’s diverse population, the United States has represented a 
safe haven for people seeking the social and economic mobility that it can offer. The belief in 
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America as a land of opportunity is strong, and the American Dream unites Americans in a 
common quest for individual and national success (ibid: 1-2). 
The Declaration of Independence holds that: «all men are created equal». This refers to the 
equality of citizens before the law and in their rights to compete for jobs, income, status, 
and education on an equal footing with others. It is connected to the individualism, or 
opportunities that the American Dream promises. Opportunity in this instance, refers to 
rewarding personal effort and achievement rather than a person’s social class, family 
standing, or some other arbitrary privilege that has not been personally earned (Dunn 2013: 
3-4). Tocqueville emphasized that egalitarianism, in its American meaning, involved equality 
of opportunity and respect, and that the United States, as a new society, lacked the 
emphasis on social hierarchy and status differences (Lipset 1996:19). Upward mobility 
represents a key attribute of the American society, and the belief in economic mobility is 
deeply embedded in the American identity and the American Dream 
 
4.2 Research design 
 
Any research design needs to maximize its quality through four conditions: construct 
validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. The choice of research method 
entails a trade-off between these conditions, and their relevance vary between qualitative 
and quantitative methods, as well as across different research designs. Even though any 
analysis will entail an amount of uncertainty and the risk of omitting important variables, 
one may improve the reliability, validity and certainty of any conclusions by paying attention 
to the rules of scientific inference (Lund 2002: 105-106). Cook and Campbell (as quoted in 
Lund 2002: 105-106) distinguish between two types of validity of causal interference. The 
internal validity addresses causality in the study, while the external validity refers to whether 
the findings of an analysis can be generalized from the sample to a larger universe.  
This thesis will conduct a single case study of American exceptionalism and consider its 
impact on U.S. grand strategy. The choice of a case study, as well as the use of data 
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triangulation, offers an in-depth analysis of a complex social phenomenon in an accurate and 
precise manner. One of the most prominent advocates of case study research, Robert Yin 
(2009: 18) defines it as «an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident». 
Single case studies have, however, been subject to a number of criticisms; the most common 
of which concerns methodological issues with regard to the conclusions one can draw from 
single cases, and the interrelated issues of methodological rigor, researcher subjectivity, and 
concerns over generalizability. These criticisms are often related to the small N-problem — 
the use of multiple causal factors to draw causal inferences from a limited number of cases 
(Rueschemeyer 2003: 305). Yin argues that in general, multiple case study is preferred over 
single case study as they offer more robust analytical conclusions and increases the 
likelihood for generalizations (Yin 2009: 156). However, the advantages of smaller case 
studies are that they often focus on information that might otherwise be ignored as the in-
depth analysis moves beyond the ordinary descriptions, and highlights reasons behind 
possible changes. Dietrich Rueschemeyer (2003) is skeptical of what he considers the most 
conventional view of single case studies, namely that the only theoretical outcome would be 
hypothesis generation that can be tested in more numerous cases. Accordingly, he argues 
that one or a few cases can provide theoretical gains as it can develop new ideas, put them 
to the test and use its results to explain certain outcomes.  
In order to make a causal inference from a single case, one has to make some kind of 
comparison, either within or across cases. The method of process tracing aims to uncover 
the variables, which together produce an observed series of events. The method identifies 
how variables, or links in a causal chain, are interrelated in time and space. It reveals both 
the causal chain and the causal mechanism between the independent and dependent 
variables in the analysis (George and Bennett 2005: 206; Gerring 2007: 173). Process tracing 
is a sub-discipline of within-case analysis (Gerring 2007: 178), but the findings may be 
generalized in the sense that a causal path identified in one case can be retrieved from other 
cases as well (George and Bennett 2005: 222). The method requires large amounts of 
empirical data as it connects several mutually independent observations together in the 
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attempt to derive or corroborate one causal inference. By identifying relevant variables, the 
use of process tracing increases internal validity and prevents false inference from 
correlation to causation in small N-studies (ibid: 173-178, 208)  
Through indicators selected to represent American exceptionalism, this thesis will analyze 
developments in this phenomenon over time to reflect on its current value in the American 
society and its importance for American policymaking. An important criterion for a well-
constructed operationalization is the construct validity or the descriptive inference — 
meaning the accordance between the selected indicator and the theoretical interpretation 
of the phenomenon that emerges from the research question (King, Keohane and Verba 
1994: 6-9; Adcock and Collier 2001: 529; Lund 2002: 105-106). Hence, a clear, unambiguous, 
and precise operationalization is a precondition for achieving a high degree of validity and 
reliability in the analysis (Lund 2002: 88-89).  
Michael Desch (1998: 150-152) presents two challenges for the assessments and testing of 
cultural theories. The first is that cultural variables are sometimes hard to clearly define and 
operationalize, while the second challenge is the focus on the particulars of single cases 
rather than on factors common to a number of cases, because they assume that each one is 
sui generis. As shown in the previous chapter, the concept of American exceptionalism 
entails a vast selection of attributes and central elements may have been omitted from the 
subsequent analysis. Considering that this thesis is limited both in time and scope, it is 
important to express that the indicators chosen for the analysis represent only a small 
sample of a larger selection of indicators related to the concept. Consequently, the results 
will not represent a fully comprehensive coverage of American exceptionalism 
As mentioned, perhaps the most prominent critique of small N-studies concerns the issue of 
external validity of the analysis. The method is criticized for producing results with lower 
external validity than analyses with a larger number of cases, thus making generalization 
difficult (King et al. 1994: 212). On the other hand, studies of smaller number of cases 
provide the opportunity to go more in-depth which provides better internal validity and 
construct validity (Gerring: 2007: 43). 
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Other related concerns are the reliability and replicability of the analysis. Reliability is about 
using the same procedures in the same way to achieve the same goals, findings and 
conclusions (King et al. 1994: 25). The goal of reliability is to minimize the errors and biases 
in a study (Yin 2009: 45). However, considering that this is a study of something exceptional 
and unique to the United States, the aim of this analysis will be to make descriptive and 
causal interferences on the basis of empirical information about the American society, and 
to trace the links between likely explanatory factors and the observed outcome (King et al. 
1994: 7-8; George and Bennett 2005: 5, 31). As Desch (1998: 155) writes: «[c]ultural theories 
that may not be amenable to generalization across cases might still lead to generalization 
within cases across time». 
Robert Yin (2009: 14-15) expresses concern about the lack of rigor while performing 
research; the absence of systematic procedures and relative methodological guidelines for 
case studies. To avoid this pitfall of case studies, the previous chapters have built up an 
integrated theoretical, conceptual and methodological framework to guide the subsequent 
analysis. This study is also based on various forms of data material and it employs data 
triangulation, the use of multiple sources and methods, to conduct an in-depth analysis of 
American exceptionalism and its effect on grand strategy. 
The first chapters have provided a thorough literature review and presented a rigorous 
framework for the procedure of the following analysis. The written sources of this study will 
consist of opinion polls and reports from research institutions in the United States such as 
the Pew Research Center, a selection of official documents and statements, and secondary 
literature such as academic papers and newspaper articles. The rationale for the selection of 
these sources is their credibility and relevance to the research questions (c.f. Kjeldstali 1999: 
171-172; Tosh 2002: 87-98). This thesis relies on articles published in well-known American 
newspapers such as The Washington Post and The New York Times, as well as magazines 
such as Foreign Policy and Foreign Affairs. .The use of acknowledged media sources 
increases the credibility of the findings of this thesis. 
The indicators will be analyzed through research on contemporary features of and trends in 
the American society. Some of these trends will briefly be compared with results from 
counterparts in Western Europe to examine the distinctiveness of the United States which is 
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embedded in Americans exceptional tradition. First, the religious dimension of American 
exceptionalism will be measured by examining levels of religious belief and the importance 
of religion in Americans’ life, as well as trends in opinion and practices of the American 
population. The second indicator will consider Americans’ attitudes and opinions related to 
U.S. global leadership, foreign policy and the willingness to engage in world politics. In 
addition, levels of patriotic sentiments will be reviewed to examine the uniqueness, or 
superiority, of the American identity. The final, and perhaps the most vital, indicator of 
American exceptionalism will be explored through levels of economic mobility and 
inequality. 
 
Table 4.2. Summary of the indicators of American Exceptionalism 
 
 Religiosity Patriotism Mobility 
Main feature Views the Unites 
States as a «blessed 
nation» which gives 
religion a unique 
impact on U.S. politics 
United States has 
been endowed with a 
«special mission» and 
the role as leader of 
the free world 
The belief in upward 
mobility based on 
personal effort and 
achievement. A key 
factor of the 
American Dream 
Measurements Level of religious 
affiliation and 
practices 
Global leadership and 
willingness to engage 
in world politics 
Level of income 
mobility 
The importance of 
religions in relation to 
current social and 
political issues 
Level of patriotic 
sentiments 
 
Level of income 
inequality 
 
 
Note that the method chosen for this thesis does not constitute a comprehensive study of 
the development of American exceptionalism. In order to understand the deeply rooted 
position of exceptionalism in American society, it would be necessary to undertake a large-
scale and thorough cultural study of American national identity and assess the development 
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from its Anglo-Protestant roots to a more multicultural society. Considering the scope of this 
thesis, that method would have been too extensive to complete the project within the given 
timeline. Accordingly, there are several interesting political, demographic, societal and 
economic attributes of the American society that are omitted from this study. One worth 
noting is indeed the rise of multiculturalism and diversity in the United States mainly due to 
globalization trends and high levels of immigration from parts of the world with other 
cultural backgrounds, especially Hispanic immigrants from Latin America (Huntington 2004: 
254). 
 
4.3 Data 
 
Quantitative survey research provides the empirical tools for a systematic study of the 
political values, attitudes, orientations and activities of ordinary people (Kittilson  2007: 
865). For this thesis, the indicators of American exceptionalism will be studied by 
investigating, empirically and systematically, contemporary trends in American society, and 
adjustments in American people’s values and beliefs. The analysis of religiosity and 
patriotism will mostly be based on quantitative opinion polling and demographic research 
from The Pew Research Center, a nonpartisan and nonprofit American think tank providing 
information on social issues, public opinion, and demographic trends shaping the United 
States and the world. The analysis of mobility, on the other hand, will depend on a landmark 
study by Raj Chetty of Harvard University and his research group consisting of scholars from 
Harvard University and University of California, Berkeley.  
Any given survey and its results may be off due to several factors. Chief among those factors 
are low response rates and non-participation, measurement errors, comparability and 
measurement equivalence in cross-national surveys (Harkness, van de Vijver, and Johnson 
2003; Couper and de Leeuw 2003; Kittilson 2007; Ariely and Davidov 2011). A potential 
disadvantage for national or regional surveys, such as those used for this thesis is fewer 
observations, but one advantage is the substantive focus on issues particularly relevant to 
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the region (Kittilson 2007: 881). Other strengths of survey data are that they are stable and 
precise. They contain a broad coverage of a given phenomenon — often over a long time 
span and under different contexts. However, relating to the selection and reporting of 
opinion polls, surveys may reflect bias which raises questions of researcher subjectivity. The 
procedures and components of the survey design from the organizational structure and 
management, through the sampling and instrument design, to the data collection methods, 
processing, and documentation, are also (Harkness et al. 2003; Couper and de Leeuw 2003).  
This makes information on the method for polling of great importance as the survey design, 
sampling procedures, and the wording of questions affects the result of any given poll, and it 
ensures that the procedures are reliable (Harkness et al. 2003; King et al. 1994: 23). 
Although national surveys lack the aspect of cross-national comparability, they often 
comprise the most methodologically sound surveys available. In general, sampling and 
interview procedures are rigorous and the issues of misinterpretation and the 
‘transportability’ of theoretical or practical concepts across national borders are  reduced 
(Kittelson 2007: 866, 887). However, some of these procedures are not possible to account 
in this thesis, but there is good evidence to assume that the Pew Research Center presents 
reliable data. They strongly value scientific principles and methodological standards such as 
independence, objectivity, accuracy, and transparency, and is known to be one of the least 
biased, and most reliable sources of polling information in the United States. 
The Harvard/Berkeley study of mobility presents new evidence on trends in 
intergenerational mobility using data from de-identified tax records. These data have less 
measurement error and much larger sample sizes than prior survey-based studies and yield 
more precise estimates of intergenerational mobility over time. Intergenerational mobility is 
estimated for the 1971 to 1993 birth cohorts. For children born between 1971 and 1986, 
mobility is measured by estimating the correlation between parent and child income 
percentile ranks, and the probability that a child reaches the top fifth of the income 
distribution conditional on her parents’ income quintile. For children born after 1986, they 
measure mobility as the correlation between parent income ranks and children’s college 
attendance rates, which are a strong predictor of later earnings (Chetty et al. 2014). 
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5 To what extent are the sources of 
American exceptionalism still present in 
American society today? 
 
The first part of the analysis will consider to what extent the sources of American 
exceptionalism are still present in American society today by examining the three indicators 
selected in the previous chapter. By understanding the contemporary position American 
exceptionalism holds in the United States today, one might be able to indicate its continued 
importance on grand strategy and foreign policy. 
American leaders and politicians generally agree that America is an exceptional nation. Yet, 
passionate and often quite personal debates emerge over what exactly makes America 
special. Conservatives often argue that President Obama is abandoning American 
exceptionalism, and pushing a secular agenda that leads him to apologize for American 
greatness. Peter Beinart (2014) writes in the National Journal that American exceptionalism 
is endangered in today’s society. Given the impact American exceptionalism is assumed to 
have on U.S. grand strategy and engagement in the world, this claim of crisis or 
endangerment deserves closer consideration. With reference to the framework of 
neoclassical realism — if what Beinart argues is true, it is crucial to analyze the domestic 
foundation of American external behavior, and reassess the current position of 
exceptionalism in American society with regard to the future direction of U.S. leadership in 
the world. 
The international system changed dramatically with the end of the Cold War, yet throughout 
this time period the core values of the American public have remained relatively stable 
according to the 2012 Pew Research Center American Values survey. Overall, the survey 
shows more stability than change across the spectrum of political value measures that Pew 
Research Center has tracked since 1987. However, this relative stability in the overall 
balance of values does not mean that the society has not undergone a fundamental 
transformation.  
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The past five decades cover the period since the Silent generation entered adulthood to 
today’s Millennials, and through this period the United States has experienced large shifts in 
terms of social and cultural issues. Many Americans, especially the younger generation, have 
become less attached to major institutions such as political parties, religion, the military, and 
marriage. For instance, just 26 percent of the Millennial generation are married. When they 
were the age that Millennials are now, 36 percent of Generation X, 48 percent of Baby 
Boomers and 65 percent of the Silent Generation were married (Pew Research Center 
2012a, 2014a). 
 
Table 5.1 The generations defined 
Generation Age of adults in 2015 Cohort 
Millennials 18-34 1981-1997 
Generation X 35-50 1965-1981 
Baby Boomers 51-69 1946-1964 
Silent Generation 70-87 1928-1945 
 
Another defining feature of American politics today is the partisan polarization between the 
Republican and Democratic Party. This is also reflected in American values and beliefs as 
they are more polarized along partisan lines than at any point since the aforementioned 
series of surveys began. In the last elections, generational differences played a larger role 
than in decades before. According to exit polls, Americans under 30 have voted more 
Democratic than other generations in each election since 2004, while older voters have 
favored the Republican candidates. Recent surveys find that half of the Millennials describe 
themselves as political independents9, with a majority identifying with or leaning towards 
the Democratic Party. By contrast, the Silent generation, to a higher degree, identifies or 
lean Republican. These generational differences are shaped by underlying values and 
opinions in a number of areas that have been undergoing change in recent years, especially 
in terms of the social changes that are occurring in the country today. Issues relating to 
diversity, equality, homosexuality, and secularism show that Millennials take a more liberal 
                                                     
9
 Not affiliated with any political party. 
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position on most social issues than the older generations (Pew Research Center 2011a, 
2012a, 2014a, 2015a).  
American exceptionalism also entails the distinction from the anciens régimes of Europe. As 
has long been the case, American values differ from those of Western Europeans in many 
important ways. Principally, these differences involve the pillars of American exceptionalism. 
For instance, Americans are more individualistic, less supportive of collective institutions, 
considerably more religious and more socially conservative than their counterparts in 
Britain, France, Germany and Spain (Pew Research Center 2011b). 
 
5.1 Religiosity 
 
The religious dimension of American exceptionalism is deeply embedded in the American 
identity, and churches are a cornerstone of American life; the United States remains the 
home of most Christians in the world, Americans are still far more willing than Europeans to 
affirm God’s importance in their lives, and religion remains powerful in terms of shaping the 
views and values of American people. Surveys of Americans’ religious beliefs and practices 
show a close link to social and political views, and demonstrate that the social and political 
fault lines in the American society run through, as well as alongside, religious traditions. The 
connection is especially strong with regard to political ideology and views on social issues, 
and it shows that the religiously affiliated part of the public and those who say that religion 
is very important in their lives, across several religious traditions, are much more likely to 
identify conservative (Pew Research Center 2008a: 3). 
American conservatives have assumed the role of «defenders of religious exceptionalism 
against Obama’s allegedly secularizing impulses» according to Peter Beinart (2014). During 
the campaign for the 2012 Republican presidential nomination, Rick Perry (2011), in a 
campaign ad, promised to «end Obama's war on religion» and to «fight against liberal 
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attacks on our religious heritage». And recently Senator Ted Cruz (2015) of Texas stated 
that: «religious liberty has never been more threatened in America than right now today». 
Yet in significant ways, the exceptional American religiosity that conservatives so 
desperately want to defend is changing. According to the 2014 Religious Landscape Survey 
by the Pew Research Center (2015b), the Christian share of the American population is 
declining, while the number of adults who do not identify with any organized religion is 
growing. The survey finds that the number of adults who consider themselves Christians fell 
from 78.4 percent in 2007 to 70.6 percent in 2014, which represents a decline of 5 million 
adults in just seven years and the lowest estimate of Christian affiliation measured from any 
sizable survey to date. Over the same period, the number of Americans defining themselves 
as unaffiliated — describing themselves as atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular — has 
increased with more than six percentage points, from 16.1 percent to 22.8 percent in 2014 
(ibid: 3-7). Through the 1980s, the General Social Survey (GSS) consistently found that 
between 5 and 8 percent of the public was unaffiliated with any particular religious tradition 
(Pew Research Center 2008b: 20). 
The decline in religiosity reveals two trends in Americans’ relationship to organized religion. 
One of the most prominent factors is generational replacement as the Millennial generation 
identifies relatively non-Christian compared to older generations. Among Millennials, only 36 
percent say the phrase “a religious person” describes them very well. By contrast, 52 percent 
of Gen Xers, 55 percent of Boomers and 61 percent of Silents say the same (Pew Research 
Center 2014a). While a majority of Millennials still consider themselves Christian, the 
number is far greater for the older generations. Conversely, the older generations identify 
less unaffiliated than Millennials. 
Table 5.2. Generational differences in affiliation 
 Silent 
Generation 
Baby 
Boomers 
Generation 
X 
Older 
Millennials 
Younger 
Millennials 
Christian 85 % 78 % 70 % 57 % 56 % 
Unaffiliated 11 % 17 % 23 % 34 % 36 % 
Source: 2014 Religious Landscape Study. The Pew Research Center (2015b) 
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The trend that younger generations are less likely than older ones to affiliate with any 
religious tradition started back in the 1970s when 13 percent of Baby Boomers were 
unaffiliated with any particular religion, according to the GSS. That compared with just 6 
percent among the Silent generation (Pew Research Center 2011a). Still, the 2014 Religious 
Landscape Survey also finds an increase in the general number of unaffiliated Americans 
across generations. The share of religiously unaffiliated Americans are growing rapidly and 
many former Christians, of all ages, are increasingly less religious. Today one-in-five 
Americans, and one-in-three Millennials, do not identify with any organized religion (Pew 
Research Center 2015b: 11-12). 
 
Table 5.3. Growing share of unaffiliated Americans across generations 
 2007 2014 Change 
Silent Generation 9 % 11 % +2 
Baby Boomers 14 % 17 % +3 
Generation X 19 % 23 % +4 
Older Millennials 25 % 34 % +9 
Younger Millennials n/a 36 % n/a 
Source: 2014 Religious Landscape Study. The Pew Research Center (2015b) 
 
There are few signs that the decline in the share of Christians in America will slow down or 
reverse as Millennials age. The survey shows that the trend of unaffiliation is growing fast, 
and occurring within a variety of demographic groups and across generations. This large and 
growing group of Americans is less religious than the public at large on many conventional 
measures, including frequency of attendance at religious services and the degree of 
importance they attach to religion in their lives (Pew Research Center 2012b: 9). According 
to the World Religion Database, Europeans were over 16 percentage points more likely to 
reject any religious affiliation than Americans in 1970. However, in 2010 this gap was 
reduced to less than half of 1 percentage point. While Americans remain more likely to 
identify with a religious tradition than people in Germany or France, they are actually less 
likely to do so than Italians and Danes (Pew Research Center 2012c). 
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There are several reasons for this change, including changes in family and work patterns, the 
politicization of religion by American conservatives, disengagement from traditional 
institutions and labels, the combination of delayed and inter-religious marriage, and 
economic development (Cohn 2015). These changes represent a steady modernization and 
secularization process of society that has characterized Western civilization, including 
America, for over two centuries, writes Peter Berkowitz (2014) in the National Journal. 
Many Americans face difficult economic circumstances, and Millennials are the first 
generation in modern times to have higher levels of student loan debt, poverty and 
unemployment, and lower levels of wealth and personal income than their two immediate 
predecessors had at the same stage of their life cycles. The economic hardships may also 
contribute to young adults’ decision to marry later in life. The median age of first marriage is 
currently the highest in modern history with 29 for men and 27 for women. Additionally, in 
contrast to trends of the past, marriage today is more frequent among those with higher 
levels of incomes and education (Pew Research Center 2014a). 
While Beinart (2014) acknowledges these explanations, he emphasizes the current 
relationship between religion and politics as the principal cause. He notes that during the 
mid-20th century, liberals were almost as likely to attend church as conservatives. But when 
the Religious Right started to arouse public concern against several social issues such as 
abortion, feminism, and gay rights in the 1970s, both political moderates and liberals began 
to identify organized Christianity with conservative politics. The Religious Right’s opposition 
to homosexuality and same-sex marriage has highlighted the generational differences in 
religion-informed issues, and has been particularly alienating to Millennials. The Pew 
Research Center (2012b, 2015c) also show that those who identify as religiously unaffiliated 
are disproportionately liberal, pro same-sex marriage, and critical of religion for playing a too 
significant role in politics. 
To give a concrete example of these changing attitudes in social issues, consider the case of 
same-sex marriage. In June 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled all state bans on same-sex 
marriage unconstitutional, thus allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry nationwide. Pew 
Research polling from 2001 found that Americans opposed same-sex marriage by a 57 
percent to 35 percent margin. Since then, support for same-sex marriage has grown at a 
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steady pace. Based on polling in 2015, a majority of Americans (55%) support same-sex 
marriage, compared with 39 percent who oppose it. This is partly due to generational 
differences. Younger generations have consistently expressed higher levels of support for 
same-sex marriage. However, older generations also have become more supportive of same-
sex marriage in recent years (Pew Research Center 2015c). 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Attitudes on same-sex marriage by generation
10
 
 
Summing up, this section finds a continued, yet slightly decreased, emphasis on the 
traditional religious pillar of American exceptionalism. While the United States remains the 
home of most Christians in the world, and religion is still powerful in terms of shaping the 
views and values of the American people, religiosity in America is in decline. The share of 
Americans that self-identify as Christians has decreased by a significant amount these past 
                                                     
10
Source: Pew Research Center (2015c) "Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage"  
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years, and simultaneously, Americans defining themselves as religiously unaffiliated — 
atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular — has increased within a variety of demographic 
groups and across generations. 
Still, the Millennial generation is more likely to reject religious affiliation than older 
Americans. There are several sociological reasons for this change, for instance changes in 
family and work patterns, detachment from traditional institutions, and the combination of 
delayed and inter-religious marriage. Another contributing factor to this decline is the 
politicization of religion by American conservatives. In issues relating to diversity, equality, 
and secularism, Millennials often take a more liberal position than the older generations, 
and the Religious Right’s opposition to abortion, homosexuality and same-sex marriage has 
highlighted the gap between religion and social views, and been particularly alienating to 
Millennials. 
 
5.2 Patriotism 
 
The second indicator of American exceptionalism can be considered an extension of the 
religious aspect of American national identity. It involves the nation’s “special mission” as 
the leader of the free world. According to most conservatives, a central element of American 
exceptionalism is their destiny to defend and promote democracy, freedom and capitalism 
through the consolidation, maintenance, and extension of America’s global leadership role. 
This leadership role has been at the heart of American exceptionalism since the founding of 
the United States, as Rich Lowry and Ramesh Ponnuru (2010) write: «The founders thought 
we would play an outsized role in the world from the very beginning». 
The Pew Research Center conducts, in association with the Council on Foreign Relations, a 
quadrennial America's Place in the World survey which examines the American public’s 
support for U.S. global engagement and opinions on the global security situation and 
challenges facing the United States. The latest edition was released in 2013, and it indicated 
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two emerging trends in the American public assessment of U.S. foreign policy and America’s 
role in the world11. 
The first trend confirms that an increasing number of Americans believe that U.S. power and 
prestige is declining in the world. For the first time in surveys dating back nearly four 
decades, a majority (53%) of the public regard the United States as “less important and 
powerful” compared with 10 years ago, while only 17 percent believe it to be “more 
important and powerful” and 27 percent ‘as important’. This is a sharp reversal of the 
findings recorded a decade ago when 45 percent of the public viewed the U.S. as more 
important and powerful, and just 20 percent said less important and powerful (Pew 
Research Center 2013a: 4-5, 15). 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Views of U.S. global leadership role
12 
                                                     
11
 The latest Pew Research Center’s America's Place in the World survey was conducted in 2013, after Bashar al-Assad’s use 
of chemical weapons against the Syrian population. Results from this report might be influenced by the American public’s 
negative assessments of Obama’s handling of the crisis which could indicate a weakened American position in the world 
compared with Russia. The topics of this report are open to misinterpretation as public opinion often can reflect changing 
sentiments rather than real changes in the society. Accordingly, it is important to take this context into consideration in 
order to avoid bias. 
 
12
 Source: Pew Research Center (2013) America’s Place in the World. General Public question: 23F1. “As important and 
powerful” responses not shown. 1974-1990 data from Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 
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From 1993 to 2004, higher percentages of the public said that the United States played a 
more important and powerful role as world leader than 10 years ago. However, this shifted 
in 2009 to 41 percent saying it was less important and powerful, while 25 percent said more 
important and 30 percent as important. In other words, the share of Americans believing the 
United States is less important and powerful in the world has increased these past years, and 
more than doubled compared with a decade ago. It also shows a big partisan swing over the 
last decade. More than 70 percent of Republicans now view the U.S. as a less important and 
powerful world leader, but when asked the same question in 2004 just 8 percent said the 
same. This shows that the question can be susceptible to changes in administrations, the 
current international environment, and swings in partisan identification (ibid: 16). 
The second trend finds that support for U.S. international engagement has fallen even 
further this past decade. About half of the public (51%) believes the United States “does too 
much in terms of solving world problems”, while 17 percent thinks it does too little and 28 
percent says it does the right amount in helping world problems. This is fairly consistent with 
past surveys, but another question regarding America’s global role represents a change 
among an increasing number of the public; 52 percent of the American public now believes 
the United States should “mind its own business internationally and let other countries get 
along the best they can on their own”. Just 38 percent disagrees with this statement. This is 
the highest percentage recorded since the question was first asked in 1964, and up from 30 
percent just a decade ago (ibid: 19-20).  
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Figure 5.3. Majority believes the U.S. should “mind its own business“
13
 
 
The United States is currently facing a challenging security environment with limited 
resources and a relative decline in power. Such challenges have led to an adjustment in its 
global leadership role. However, just as the public appeared war weary, Americans suddenly 
showed support for at least limited military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL14) (Telhami 2015). Seventy percent of Americans rank ISIL the biggest 
challenge facing the United States in the Middle East—well above Iran (12%) and 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict (13%). Opinion polls also suggest a willingness to continue the 
operations and even escalate them if necessary. Most Americans (57%) would oppose 
sending ground forces if airstrikes fail to defeat ISIL, yet a majority of Republican (53%) does 
support the use of ground troops compared with only 36 percent of Democrats and 31 
percent of Independents (The Brookings Institution 2015).  
                                                     
13
Source: Pew Research Center (2013) America’s Place in the World. General Public question: PEW2d. 1964-1991 data from 
Gallup  
 
14
 Also known as the Islamic State (IS), the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or Daesh. 
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Despite this opposition, the American public expresses the need to confront ISIL and the 
current crisis in Syria and Iraq. When given the choice between two opposing views on the 
level of U.S. involvement, one suggesting that the United States “should stay out of the 
conflict” and another one suggesting intervention “at the necessary level”, 57 percent of 
Americans chose the latter (67% of Republicans, 52% Democrats and 51% Independents) 
(ibid.). One reason for public ambivalence—wanting the U.S. to intervene at the “necessary 
level” while excluding ground forces—may be the assessment of prospects of success and 
failure of intervention. The public is concerned about Americans joining ISIL and carrying 
attacks on American soil. This fear could be increased following the recent massacre carried 
out against Charlie Hebdo in Paris (Telhami 2015). 
The American population’s desire to pull back has increased from past years. 
War/intervention fatigue after the lengthy engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2011 
military intervention in Libya, the conflict in Ukraine and the current crisis in Syria and Iraq 
constitutes a major part of the explanation, but the restraint also has domestic roots. Many 
Americans find that the social, political and economic challenges at home are of greater 
priority than most foreign policy objectives (Hormats 2014). This is also the conclusion from 
the Pew Research Center’s America's Place in the World survey. When those who say the 
United States does “too much” internationally are asked to describe in their own words why 
they feel this way, nearly half (47%) lists some domestic problem that deserves more 
attention. Correspondingly, 80 percent of Americans agreed with the statement: «We should 
not think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our national problems 
and building up our strength and prosperity here at home» (Pew Research Center 2013a: 4-
7, 19-20). 
These two findings show that something very unusual is going on in the American public’s 
attitudes toward U.S foreign policy and leadership in the world. As many of the findings in 
the survey were consistent with those from previous years, they serve as a baseline which 
highlights the exception of these two. However, this restraint is not an expression of across-
the-board isolationism. Even as doubts grow about the United States’ geopolitical role, most 
Americans (66%) believe the benefits from U.S. participation in the global economy 
62 
 
outweigh the risks. And support for closer trade and business ties with other nations stands 
at its highest point in more than a decade (77%) (Pew Research Center 2013a: 23).   
Similarly, Americans are neither willing to abandon internationalism nor to embrace 
unilateralism. When asked what kind of role the United States should play in the world, 72 
percent answered a shared leadership role. Nearly 8 in 10 Americans (77%) agree that “in 
deciding on its foreign policies, the U.S. should take into account the views of its major 
allies” and a majority (56%) of the public agrees that “the United States should cooperate 
fully with the United Nations”. Even further, 56 percent of Americans rejects the idea that 
the U.S., as the most powerful nation in the world, should go its own way in international 
matters (ibid: 18-21). 
Summing up, the report shows that Americans are conflicted about the U.S. role in the 
world. On one hand, a majority of the public thinks the United States should mind its own 
business internationally and focus on problems at home. On the other hand, they want the 
United States to play a leading role in world affairs, and they see the benefit of greater 
involvement in the global economy. This can be viewed as a natural shift in the public’s 
assessment on foreign policy rather than a decline in power; it is a definite wish to pull back 
in terms of foreign policy, but a willingness to continue to engage and further integrate on 
the economic front. This is also reflected in the results of the 2014 Chicago Council Survey of 
American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy. This report finds that the public shows 
consistent and stable support for a wide variety of American engagement, ranging from an 
international military presence and espionage to dialogue with hostile actors and 
international trade. They see benefits to multilateral cooperation enshrined in alliances, 
trade agreements, treaties, and working through the United Nations (The Chicago Council on 
Global Affairs 2014: 41).  
The generational gap affecting American politics is also present in terms of foreign policy and 
international engagement. The Millennial generation is far less likely than their elders to 
endorse the exceptional global role of the United States. While all generations favor more 
focus on domestic issues rather than problems overseas, Millennials have been less inclined 
to support an active role for the United States than the older generations. The fact that the 
Millennial generation does not remember the Cold War and that they are shaped by the 
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interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, provides them with a different view of America’s role 
in the world. Combined with older generations that have tired of playing a global leadership 
role, it is hardly surprising that attitudes are changing.  
Americans are somewhat more inclined than Western Europeans to say that: «it is 
sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world». Similarly, 
Americans more often than their Western European counterparts believe that getting 
approval from the United Nations before the use of military force “would make it too 
difficult to deal with an international threat” (Pew Research Center 2011b). However, 
Millennials, more than any other generation, are more likely than older people to favor 
multilateralism over unilateralism and the use of diplomacy to ensure peace, rather than a 
reliance on military strength. They are 23 percentage points more likely than the Silent 
generation to say that in terms of foreign policy the United States should “take its allies 
interests into account, even if it means making compromises”, and Americans under 30 are 
more favorable to the United Nations compared to Americans over 50 (Pew Research Center 
2011a: 89; 2013b: 4). 
The shift would not be as profound had it merely represented the younger generation being 
more willing to embrace multilateralism in U.S. foreign policy. As shown in previous 
chapters, America’s exceptional role in the world is about more than just foreign policy 
behavior. American exceptionalism represents a sense of self; a distinct belief that the 
United States is unique, if not superior to other nations, and American behavior abroad is an 
expression of this belief. Therefore, Beinart (2014) argues that: «Americans’ declining belief 
in our special virtue as a world power really is connected to our declining belief in our special 
virtue as a people».  
Nearly all Americans consider themselves patriotic and voice pride in being an American. 
Seymour M. Lipset (1996: 51) makes reference to opinion polls conducted in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s that find 75 percent of American adults to say that they are proud to be 
Americans, with the degree of patriotism to be even higher for American youth. A 2010 
national survey by the Pew Research Center found that more than 83 percent of Americans 
say they are either extremely proud (52%) or very proud (31%) to be an American. However, 
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it also showed that people younger than 30 are far less likely than older Americans to say 
they are extremely proud of being an American (Pew Research Center 2010). 
In 2014, a clear majority of the American people considered the United States to be one of 
the greatest countries in the world. Nevertheless, the view that the United States is 
exceptional — as in standing above all other countries in the world — has declined by 10 
points since 2011. 
 
Table 5.4. Declining share of Americans say the U.S. stand above all other countries 
 2011 2014 Change 
Total 38 % 28 % -10 
18-29 27 % 15 % -12 
30-49 38 % 26 % -12 
50-64 40 % 33 % -7 
65+ 50 % 40 % -10 
Source: Pew Research Center (2014c) 
 
This decline, or what Beinart (2014) calls “the loss of American civilizational self-confidence” 
has occurred across most demographic and political groups. The current polling shows that 
the American public is coming closer to Europeans in not seeing their culture as superior to 
that of other nations.  
These polls also revealed generational differences in beliefs about whether the U.S. is “the 
greatest country in the world”. In both 2011 and 2014, the younger generation was far less 
likely than older Americans to say that the U.S. stands above all other nations: Just 15 
percent of those under 30 expressed that view in 2014, down from 27 percent three years 
earlier (Pew Research Center 2014b). 
Interestingly, similar surveys from Pew Research Center’s The American-Western European 
Values Gap, show that young Americans are no more “civilizationally self-confident” than 
their peers in Britain, France, Germany, and Spain. For example, in 2002 respondents from 
the United States were 20 percentage points more likely to agree with the statement “our 
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people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others” than Germans. In 2007, the gap 
was reduced to 13 percentage points, and by 2011 it was down to just 2. When asked in 
2011 about cultural superiority, the survey found that Americans over the age of 50 were 15 
points more likely to agree with the statement than Western Europeans. On the opposite 
side, Americans under 30 were, in fact, less likely to answer yes than their equivalents in 
Britain, Germany, and Spain (Pew Research Center 2011b). 
One of the largest factors driving the current generation gap is the arrival of the diverse and 
heavily Democratic-leaning Millennials. Shaped by the presidencies of Bill Clinton and 
George W. Bush and growing up at a time when America’s relative power in the world has 
declined, younger Americans tend to identify more liberal on most social and political issues. 
This, in addition to showing more willingness than older generation in terms of embracing 
inclusion and diversity, may not correlate with claims of American superiority. In 2014, the 
Millennial generation was much less inclined than their elders to self-identify as patriotic. 
Only about half (49%) of Millennials say the phrase “a patriotic person” describes them very 
well. Meanwhile, 61 percent of Gen Xers, 75 percent of Boomers and 81 percent of Silents 
say this describes them very well (Pew Research Center 2014a). 
 As Peter Beinart (2014) notes in relation to young Americans’ opinion on the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq: 
As young Americans turned against the war, they turned against Bush's exceptionalist vision 
of an America with unique burdens and privileges. Even more fundamentally, they turned 
against the chest-thumping, "We're No. 1" brand of patriotism that often accompanied it. 
 
The turn against the exceptionalist foreign policy under George W. Bush, was an advantage 
for Obama in the 2008 presidential election. A foreign policy doctrine based on the idea that 
the United States can play by its own rules on the world stage as led under Bush, combined 
with a complex international situation and growing challenges at home, has led to a majority 
of Americans who regards the United States as less important and powerful in the world 
compared with ten years ago, and a public who wants a less active leadership role for the 
United States in world politics. 
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5.3 Economic mobility 
 
The third dimension of American exceptionalism, and likely the most fundamental, is upward 
economic mobility. The American people declared their independence with the famous 
words “all men are created equal” and ever since American society has been defined by the 
promise of equal opportunities for all citizens regardless of origins, social class, family 
standing, or some other arbitrary, non-meritocratic privilege. The idea of the United States 
as the land of opportunity and the ability to make one's own way is firmly integrated in the 
American identity and the American Dream. Hence, resisting development into an Old World 
class-based society where one is born into its destiny is of great importance for the American 
people. 
There is no denying that the United States faces disturbing economic challenges after the 
2007-2009 recession, and the issue of inequality is one of the most urgent. Economic 
mobility in America is lower than in most other developed countries, and growing inequality, 
increasing poverty, and stagnant middle-class incomes are threats to economic growth and 
social cohesion (Kruger 2012; Berkowitz 2014). This is mainly due to the increasing gap 
between the more stable, wealthy and educated parts of the population on one side, and 
the working class faced with economic stagnation and instability on the other. These higher 
levels of inequality are often associated with less upward mobility and lower equality of 
opportunity.  
George Packer (2011) wrote in Foreign Affairs that the income gap, combined with the rise 
of organized money, lobbyism and special interests into politics from the 1970s, has 
marginalized the lower and middle classes’ opportunities of influencing politics. According to 
Packer (2011: 31), «inequality corrodes trust among fellow citizens, making it seem as if the 
game is rigged». He argues that this generates anger towards American elites and 
government in all forms, hardens society into a class-based system, reduces the willingness 
to find ambitious solutions to collective problems, and generally undermines democracy. 
One example of this anger is the protest movement Occupy Wall Street. The movement and 
their slogan “we are the 99%” received global attention and raised issues such as economic 
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inequality, corruption and the influence of corporations on government. While the protests 
have quieted, the study of income distributions over time and between places has increased. 
Thomas Piketty’s Capital (2013), Anthony Atkinson’s Inequality (2015), Joseph E. Stiglitz’s 
The Price of Inequality (2012) and The Great Divide (2015), and Robert Reich’s Aftershock 
(2011) have all contributed to the elevation of this emerging debate in the United States. 
For the most part, Americans endorse the exceptionalist narrative of economic mobility. 
However, as inequality rises in America, conservatives are becoming increasingly concerned 
that Obama is making the United States more like Europe by encouraging reliance on 
government rather than individual initiatives. «Frankly, the president’s policies have made 
income inequality worse» stated John Boehner, current Speaker of the House of 
Representatives15 , in an interview on CBS’s 60 Minutes discussing the President’s State of 
the Union Address. «All the regulations that are coming out of Washington make it more 
difficult for employers to hire more people, chief amongst those, I would argue is 
Obamacare – which basically puts a penalty or a tax on employers for every new job they 
create» (Boehner 2015). 
The American public largely agrees that economic inequality has grown over the past 
decade. In a recent poll from the Pew Research Center, 65 percent of Americans believe: 
“the gap between the rich and everyone else” in the United States has been increasing the 
last 10 years. This view is shared across partisan lines, but respondents differ on the 
government’s role in reducing this wealth gap. An overwhelming degree of Democrats (90%) 
agrees the government should do “a lot” or “some”, while only half as many Republicans 
(45%) say the same. Instead, nearly half of Republicans believe the government should do 
“not much” or “nothing at all” to reduce the gap between the rich and everyone else. 
Moreover, by a 60 percent to 36 percent margin, most Americans feel the economic system 
unfairly favors the wealthy, as opposed to being fair to most Americans. The same poll finds 
that more than half of the public (51%) believes that having more advantages than others 
generally has more to do with why a person is rich than hard work. In the midst of these 
views of skepticism, most Americans continue to believe in the American Dream. Six-in-ten 
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 John Boehner announced on the 25th of September that he will resign the Speakership and retire from Congress at the 
end of October 2015. Source: The Washington Post (2015) “House Speaker John Boehner to resign at end of October”. 
Retrieved from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/09/25/boehner-resigns/ 
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say “most people who want to get ahead can make it if they are willing to work hard” (Pew 
Research Center 2014c:1-4) 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Does hard work lead to success?
16
 
 
According to an April 2014 NBC/Wall Street Journal poll, a majority of Americans believes 
that the economic and political structures in the United States “are stacked against people 
like me” Similarly, 54 percent also agreed that “because of the widening gap between the 
incomes of the wealthy and everyone else, America is no longer a country where everyone 
regardless of their background has an opportunity to get ahead”. (NBC News/Wall Street 
Journal 2014). There is a growing public perception that intergenerational income mobility 
— that it, a child’s chance of moving up the income distribution ladder relative to her 
parents — is declining in the United States. 
However, according to a landmark study led by Raj Chetty and other researchers at Harvard 
University and the University of California, Berkeley, economic mobility has not changed in a 
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half-century in America. In contrary to popular perception, the study of trends in 
intergenerational mobility in the United States found that percentile rank-based measures of 
intergenerational mobility have remained relatively stable for the 1971-1993 cohorts. It 
states that children growing up in America today are just as likely to climb the economic 
ladder as children born more than a half-century ago. For instance, the probability that a 
child reaches the top fifth of the income distribution given parents in the bottom fifth of the 
income distribution is 8.4 percent for children born in 1971, compared with 9 percent for 
those born in 1986. Another example, children born into the highest-income families in 1984 
was 74.5 percentage points more likely to attend college than those from the lowest-income 
families. The corresponding gap for children born in 1993 is 62.2 percentage points, 
suggesting that, if anything, mobility has increased slightly in recent cohorts. Moreover, 
intergenerational mobility is fairly stable over time in each of the nine census divisions of the 
United States even though they have very different levels of mobility (Chetty et al. 2014: 1). 
Despite the fact that measures of mobility have remained stable, income inequality has 
increased substantially over the same time period and the levels are high in the United 
States compared with other OECD countries. Hence, the finding suggests that who your 
parents are and how much they earn is more consequential for American youths today than 
in the past. This is mainly due to the fact that as the gap between the bottom and the top of 
the economic ladder has become more evident, moving up ladder has not gotten any easier 
(ibid.). President Obama (as quoted by Kruger 2012) summarized this rise in inequality when 
he said, «over the last few decades, the rungs on the ladder of opportunity have grown 
farther and farther apart, and the middle class has shrunk». Such findings are clearly not in 
line with the belief in economic mobility, which is deeply embedded in the American identity 
and the American Dream.  
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Figure 5.4. Changes in the income ladder in the United States
17
  
 
«[..] it is not true that mobility itself is getting lower» Lawrence F. Katz, a Harvard economist 
and mobility scholar, said in The Washington Post. «What’s really changed is the 
consequences of it. Because there’s so much inequality, people born near the bottom tend 
to stay near the bottom, and that’s much more consequential than it was 50 years ago». 
Those findings put the debate about the consequences of economic inequality in a new light. 
Because the consequences of mobility are, in fact, what has changed (Tankersly 201418).  
Robert Putnam (2015) suggests in this new book Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis that 
the United States is losing its status as a nation of opportunity. The children growing up in 
America today, he claims, no longer have equality of opportunity. In the American Dream, 
upward mobility is equal for all, constrained only by meritocratic factors such as ability, hard 
work, and ambition. In Our Kids, Putnam presents data which finds the emergence of an 
“opportunity gap” between education for wealthy and poor children in America during the 
last twenty-five years, and he explains how differences in politics, class, and race now are 
impacting the American Dream. He contends that the loss of faith in mobility is the real issue 
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 Source: Chetty et al. (2014 ) “Is the United States Still a Land of Opportunity?”  – Executive Summary.  
18
 Article published by The Washington Post without page numbers. 
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in today’s society, not economic inequality. The perception of one’s opportunities to climb 
up the ladder constitutes a fundamental part of the belief in the exceptional America. The 
rising issue of inequality would not be as important if it had not been for the declining faith 
in the American Dream of upward mobility.  
Many Americans currently face difficult economic challenges, particularly the younger 
generation. As previously mentioned, Millennials are the first generation in the modern era 
to have higher levels of student loan debt, poverty and unemployment, and lower levels of 
wealth and personal income than their two immediate predecessors had at the same stage 
of their life cycle. Their difficult circumstance reflects both the impact of the recession, and 
the longer-term effects of globalization and rapid technological change on the American 
workforce. Median household income in the United States today remains below its 1999 
peak, the longest stretch of stagnation in the modern era, and during that time income and 
wealth gaps have widened. It should come as no surprise that recent surveys find that about 
70 percent of the American public believes young adults today face greater economic 
challenges than their elders when they were first starting out (Pew Research Center 2014a). 
A third of older Millennials (ages 27 to 34) have a four-year college degree or more, making 
them the best-educated cohort of young adults in American history. Education highly 
correlates with economic success, and even more so for this generation as the economy is 
growing more knowledge-based. Despite their economic circumstances, the Millennial 
generation are highly optimistic about their economic futures. More than 80 percent say 
they either currently “have enough money to lead the lives they want” (32%) or “expect to in 
the future” (53%). None of the other cohorts in the survey are equally optimistic (Pew 
Research Center 2014a). 
The debate on economic mobility and inequality is emerging in the United States. As shown 
by Boehner’s statement, when acknowledging these issues conservatives often blame 
President Obama’s policies. While several Democrats would prefer to raise the topic of 
economic inequality more often, the public does not seem to respond to talk of 
redistribution when it comes to the widening income gap. Republicans, on the other hand, 
would prefer to focus on economic growth rather than economic concerns. However, this 
does not take the difficulties Americans are facing into consideration. Issues important to 
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the working and middle-class in the United States such as low and/or stagnant wages, the 
cost of higher education and the student debt problem, are not appeased by talk of tax cuts, 
reduced regulation, and restricted redistribution (Gerson 2015). Still, the question of income 
distribution and economic issues will most certainly play a predominant role in the race for 
the Presidency between now and November 2016. 
 
5.4 The current position of American exceptionalism 
 
A closer examination of the three indicators shows that American society is indeed 
undergoing fundamental changes. By tracing trends in the core features of American 
exceptionalism — the view of religion in society and politics, the American global leadership 
role and the belief in upward mobility — this analysis finds that such beliefs have declined 
these past decades for all three indicators, and that the pillars of American exceptionalism 
are especially being challenged by a generational shift in the United States. During the past 
five decades, from the Silent generation until today’s Millennials, the United States has been 
subject to fundamental changes of social, cultural, economic, and political nature which has 
generated an adjustment in the American populations beliefs in American exceptionalism. 
The fact that the belief in American exceptionalism once again was lifted to the forefront of 
political debate earlier this year, drove President Obama into delivering a speech at the 50th 
Anniversary of the Selma Montgomery Marches which reflected his effort to articulate a new 
form of American exceptionalism with a more inwardly focus. He presented the idea of «a 
patriotism that embraces the darker moments in American history and celebrates the ability 
of the unsung and the outsiders to challenge the country’s elite and force change» (Jaffe 
201519). This view is seemingly more suited to a country whose population is growing more 
diverse and whose values are changing 
. 
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6 What consequences might an adjustment 
in American exceptionalism have on 
America’s global role and strategy? 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has held a preeminent position in the 
liberal world order which was established after World War II. American leadership currently 
represents the status quo; the stability of the international system is reliant on American 
power, and allies of the United States have been organized around U.S. security guarantees. 
Today, the foundation of this world order is eroding. The rules-based system has begun to 
unravel following the problems and setbacks of the past decades20 (Kissinger 2014: 2-8). This 
might signal a transition toward a post-American world order or into a world of global 
disorder resembling the 1930s21 (Kagan 2014). 
Nevertheless, Robert Kagan (2012) rejects that the erosion of the liberal world order is due 
to the decline of American power, as several scholars today contend22. Because of its 
geopolitical position, the United States is not only the world’s sole great power, largely 
unthreatened on its own borders. It has a dynamic and diverse economy and a public with 
an entrepreneurial culture. It has a worldwide network of strong and/or wealthy allies, 
strategic security partnerships and military bases, military superiority, and a large nuclear 
deterrent (Walt 2015). As such, America’s capabilities remain adequate to face the present 
challenges.  
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 Chief among them: The current civil war in Syria, the challenge of terrorism and instability in the Middle East and North 
Africa, the Ukraine crisis and Russian ambitions to restore its power position, growing nationalist power tensions in East 
Asia and China’s attempts to redraw maritime borders in the South China Sea, and the Iranian nuclear and geopolitical 
challenge. 
 
21
 The post-World War I era in which the great powers either lacked the will (Britain and the United States) or wherewithal 
(France) to police the global order. As a result, revisionist regimes seeking to revise their positions realized that they could 
fill the power vacuum which led to aggression and the rise of dictatorships around the world (Stephens 2014). 
 
22
 For more on America’s decline see Fareed Zakaria (2009) The Post-American World. New York: W.W. Norton & Company; 
Richard Haass (2008) “The Age of Nonpolarity, What Will Follow U.S. Dominance” Foreign Affairs 87(3): 44-56; Charles A. 
Kupchan (2013) No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
and Ian Bremmer (2015) Superpower: Three Choices for America's Role in the World. Penguin Books 
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Arguably, the erosion of the liberal world order is rather due to a question of Americans’ 
sense of self and the purpose of American power. In order to understand the complex 
nature of the American world order, it is necessary to understand the complex character of 
the American people. This complex character, which this thesis has argued constitutes the 
concept of American exceptionalism, endorses contradictory impulses in foreign policy and 
ambivalent views on what role, if any, the United States should play in the world.  
Henry Kissinger (2014: 234) writes: «No other nation has played such a decisive role in 
shaping contemporary world as the United States, nor professed such ambivalence about 
participating in it». Americans act out of a sense of responsibility and then resent and fear 
the burden of responsibility they have taken upon themselves (Kagan 2012: 14). This 
ambivalence led the United States toward the role of reluctant sheriff23  after the Cold War, 
which was reflected in John Kerry’s speech at the 2004 Democratic National Convention: 
«The United States of America never goes to war because we want to; we only go to war 
because we have to». 
The erosions in the liberal world order and major domestic constraints, such as limited 
resources and conflicting public options, constitute a difficult task for American leaders and 
policymakers. Faced with this pressure, what is the sustainable course for the United States 
— further engagement or retrenchment? Key questions for future American leadership to 
answer are:  
I. How can the United States best achieve balance between its pressing needs at home 
and its established role as a world leader and commitments abroad?  
II. What are the consequences for the liberal world order if the declined belief in 
American exceptionalism leads the United States toward further disengagement and 
abandonment of some of its idealistic foundations? 
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 Term coined by Richard Haass (1997) Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the Cold War. New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations Press 
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How can the United States best confront its upcoming challenges? The fundamental issue for 
the United States as it faces the future is closing the Lippmann gap24. This means «bringing 
into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s commitments and 
the nation’s power» (Lippmann as quoted in Huntington 1987: 453). In order to do this, the 
United States will need to undertake new strategic priorities and reassess its current 
international commitments. 
The 2015 National Security Strategy outlines an international order in need of American 
leadership to face acute and growing challenges. This leadership role is grounded in the 
enduring national interests of the United States which are the following (The White House 
2015: 1-2, 19-23): 
1. Strengthening American national defense, and providing security of U.S. homeland, 
its citizens, and its allies and partners 
2. Maintaining a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international 
economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity. 
3. Respect for universal values and the defense of human rights at home and around 
the world. The support of emerging democracies and prevention of mass atrocities 
are also considered to be in America’s interests.  
4. Defense of the rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that 
promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet 
global challenges.  
 
Anne-Marie Slaughter (2015) defines American interests as defensive interests and 
affirmative goals. Defensive interests correspond with the narrow definition of security in 
the first two interests of the National Security Strategy. Meanwhile, the affirmative goals the 
United States pursues in the world relate to American ideals and values which are clearly in 
line with the two last interests of the United States. The continued value placed on these 
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 The term Lippmann gap was coined by Samuel P. Huntington in 1987, named after journalist Walter Lippmann. 
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affirmative goals in the formulation of strategy is at the core of the current debate. Since 
they constitute the foundation of the liberal world order that promotes peace, security, and 
opportunity through cooperation, the future of this order is reliant upon their prevalence. 
This previous chapter found that American beliefs in the exceptionalist narrative are in 
decline, and the influence of liberal ideals and values on U.S. grand strategy seem to be 
weakened for some time to come. In order to protect, preserve and advance American 
interests, security and prosperity in the long run, different strategic choices are available to 
balance the ends, ways and means of American power. As previously shown, strategic 
options available for the United States can be placed on a spectrum of ideal types of strategy 
from restraint to assertiveness. Whether the United States can continue to pursue a variant 
of primacy, or whether it should pursue a more restrained strategy of collective security, 
selective engagement, offshore balancing or neo-isolationism depends, to a large degree, on 
the ends and means at its disposal, and the purpose of its power.  
The following sections will analyze the strategic options available for the United States 
through the lens of American exceptionalism, discuss the appropriate role for the United 
States as it faces its future, and consider the consequences of more uncertainty about the 
idealistic component of American strategic thinking.  In addition, it will consider the 
implications for the international order and the promotion of collective interests if the 
declined belief in American exceptionalism leads the United States toward abandonment of 
America’s role as keeper of the world order. Finally, this thesis will propose a case for a more 
sustainable American grand strategy in line with the current international and domestic 
circumstances.  
 
6.1 American Exceptionalism and U.S. Grand Strategy  
 
Grand strategies provide nations with an overarching sense of purpose in their international 
affairs. Grand strategy helps to build domestic support and provide international clarity for a 
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nation’s foreign policies. The formulation of grand strategy involves the identification and 
prioritization of national interests, goals and objectives, as well as any potential threats to 
such interests and the resources and means with which a state will meet threats in order to 
protect its interests. These material and systemic factors are, following the neoclassical 
realist framework, filtered through domestic and ideational factors to be translated into 
adjustments in strategic choice 
Among others, Trevor B. McCrisken (2003) argues that the belief in American exceptionalism 
can be understood as an essential part of the domestic nature of the United States, and it 
has thus provided and continues to provide a vital element in the framework for U.S. grand 
strategy making. It is necessary for the United States to follow a coherent grand strategy 
which allocates its resources accordingly, and makes the inevitable trade-offs and priorities 
to address the strategic risks to American interests. Throughout the history of America, 
American exceptionalism has inspired formulations of grand strategies ranging across the 
spectrum. It has served as the basis for various ideas about America’s global role and the 
best way to promote the American way of life, and it has manifested itself in the form of 
political idealism which historically has been counterbalanced by the principles of realism 
with regard to the direction of grand strategy. 
In his second inaugural address, President George W. Bush (2005) articulated what had 
become a dominant and bipartisan vision of American grand strategy: 
America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one. From the day of our Founding, 
we have proclaimed that every man and woman on this earth has rights, and dignity, and 
matchless value, because they bear the image of the Maker of Heaven and earth. Across the 
generations we have proclaimed the imperative of self-government, because no one is fit to 
be a master, and no one deserves to be a slave. Advancing these ideals is the mission that 
created our Nation. It is the honorable achievement of our fathers. Now it is the urgent 
requirement of our nation's security, and the calling of our time. So it is the policy of the 
United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in 
every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. 
 
This address clearly reflects the impact American exceptionalism can have on strategic 
thinking: First, American exceptionalism shows how religion shapes the nation’s character; 
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helps form Americans’ ideas about the world; and influences the ways Americans respond to 
events beyond their borders. Religion explains both Americans’ sense of themselves as a 
chosen people and their belief that they have a duty to spread their values throughout the 
world (Mead 2006: 24). Second, American exceptionalism also indicates the importance of 
the universal principle of individual freedom. Equality and social and economic mobility 
constitute the American Dream and the value of meritocratic factors such as ability, effort 
and ambition. Finally, American exceptionalism represents patriotism through the moralism 
and idealism in its strategic approach; the promotion of democracy and human rights 
around the world as the guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy  
In order to effectively formulate a grand strategy it is significant to understand how 
American exceptionalism continues to affect American strategic thinking. Due to the unique 
synthesis between realism and idealism in American strategic culture, the continued 
importance of idealistic values and affirmative goals in the nation’s grand strategic course is 
dependent on the preservation of the exceptional American self-understanding. Because of 
its profound impact on strategic thinking, it might also contribute to a degree of uncertainty 
and ambiguity when it comes to America’s role in the world and its commitments in 
international affairs. 
 
6.2 The appropriate role of the United States in the world 
 
Debates on American exceptionalism and its importance for policy formulation seem to 
emerge as soon as there is anxiety about the American position in the world caused by an 
economic, social or political setback. Following the global financial crisis, a population 
characterized by intervention fatigue, and large domestic economic challenges, it is not 
surprising that questions regarding an American decline and a retrenchment from U.S. global 
affairs emerge. The ideological foundation of American exceptionalism has both influenced 
and constrained U.S. behavior abroad throughout its nation’s history. The liberal 
assumptions of American strategic culture have influenced strategic thinking in an idealistic 
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manner and encouraged the United States to define its interests and goals in expansive and 
global terms which requires continued global engagement and a leadership role for the 
United States. At the same time, the tradition of limited liability, which is rooted in a 
combination of historical, geopolitical, institutional, and cultural factors, has predisposed 
Americans to limit costs of overseas commitments and toward strategies of non-
entanglement and disengagement. 
The synthesis between idealism and realism in American strategic thinking has historically 
served the United States well. However, after the Cold War, the heavy emphasis on idealism 
based on a bipartisan consensus that the United States should spread its vision of 
democracy, freedom, and economic system, outbalanced the realist aspect. This version 
deeply embraced the concept of American exceptionalism which sees the United States as 
uniquely qualified to lead the world. It reflected an institutionalized desire to maintain 
American primacy in the world and to promote American values abroad. The vital or core 
interests of the United States has remained remarkably consistent, and American 
overarching priorities and national means are largely characterized by stability and 
continuity over time. Simultaneously, the United States adjusts its global strategy in line with 
changing national and international conditions. 
As shown in the first part of this analysis; the belief in American exceptionalism is 
significantly changing. The American public in general, and the younger generation in 
particular, are losing faith in its core pillars — religiosity, patriotism and mobility. Today, the 
American public seems unwilling to continue to support a strategy of primacy, and they 
remain divided in their views of the appropriate role for the United States in the world and 
the purpose of American power.  
Following the decline in American exceptionalist sentiments and the desire to disengage 
from global affairs, a strategy of restraint seems to fit the moment. American leadership 
today might be more inclined to pull back from international commitments, which is already 
reflected in the foreign policy of the Obama administration, and American grand strategy 
may be moving away from its “special mission” in the world, and back toward the narrower 
focus on defensive interests and the role of leading by example. Even as most politicians still 
continue to assert their commitment to a global American leadership, a more restricted view 
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has taken hold among scholars of international relations over the past decades: that the 
United States should abandon its strategy of primacy and replace it with one of restraint 
(Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth 2013: 131-132). Hence, the question of whether to engage 
or retreat from global affairs reflects the basic issue of the debate of an appropriate grand 
strategy for the United States. 
The declined belief in the exceptionalist narrative has undoubtedly had a profound effect on 
strategic thinking in the United States. This makes the consequences of further uncertainty 
with regard to the idealistic component of U.S. grand strategy the core of the current 
debate. There are many Americans who feel the United States should go back to realist 
political principles instead of the ideals of self-righteous moralizing. While others would 
prefer that the United States moved away from its exceptionalist influences all together, and 
toward a strategy of disengagement and non-entanglement. Given the impact the 
exceptional narrative is assumed to have on policy formulation, what are the implications for 
grand strategic choice if the idea of American exceptionalism is in retreat? 
American exceptionalism provides the idealistic foundation for two fundamentally different 
identities and foreign policy approaches. The division of the debate on grand strategy into 
shapers and restrainers correspond with these divergent approaches as both dichotomies 
contrast each other in their views about America’s global role. American exceptionalism thus 
involves a substantial potential for adjustments, fluctuations and inner conflict with regard 
to the nature and extent of international engagement.  
The exemplary identity is said to inspire an isolationist foreign policy which entails that the 
United States should be reluctant to involve itself with the outside world and nurture its own 
political experiment. This corresponds with the opinions of restrainers who prefer a light 
footprint in the use of force in order to avoid the slippery slope into the messes of sustained 
involvements, and who believe that solving domestic challenges should be of higher priority 
than international commitments. 
Meanwhile, the internationalist foreign policy, inspired by the missionary approach, entails 
an active engagement in world affairs with the United States acting out the mission they 
have been given. Similarly, shapers believe the United States must remain its leadership role 
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and influence developments all over the world because global events could damage 
American interests. Accordingly, different interpretations of the challenges to American 
power lead to different approaches to grand strategy. While restrainers and exemplarists 
seek to limit U.S. engagement in international events, shapers and internationalists seek to 
influence them. 
The affirmative goals of the United States are deeply rooted in American history, ideals and 
identity. For shapers, national security and defensive interests are uniquely connected to 
idealism, the spread and protection of democracy and liberal values, the promotion of a 
more peaceful world order, and the maintenance of global stability. Realists tend to define 
national interests in terms of power and capabilities relative to the evolving international 
system. Restrainers support the protection of narrower and defensive national security 
interests at the expense of such affirmative goals. American foreign policy will always entail 
reconciliation between these two elements. The question involves their composition within 
administrations and their implications when it comes to policy objectives and choice of 
strategy. The strategic options also represent different variations in the willingness and the 
tendency to use military force or economic sanctions to achieve grand strategy objectives, 
and the equivalent value of soft power instruments, such as diplomacy and institutional 
policies, to ensure that the United States is an attractive partner. 
Shapers, which often refer to adherents of cooperative security and primacy, have focused 
on an expansive use of American power to advance democracy and human rights, and for 
humanitarian or nation-building purposes. These views coincide with idealist views on the 
use of military force to advance or defend idealistic values, although they increasingly 
recognize that the use of military force should be linked to national interests. Over the last 
decade, America’s “special mission” has been articulated to legitimize policies such as the 
invasion, occupation and failed reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2011 NATO 
operation in Libya and the current military operation against ISIL. These wars and policies 
have been costly for the United States, both in terms of resources and casualties. They have 
also been accompanied by violations of human rights and civil liberties, in the United States 
and abroad, as the ‘mission’ has justified a disregard for American laws and values as well as 
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international norms and treaty obligations, primarily with regard to torture and the 
treatment of prisoners of war25. 
Adherents of primacy are considered the most idealistic in the sense that the spread of 
liberal values such as human rights and democracy are considered as a main concern for U.S. 
foreign policy and a vital component of its national interests. Idealists have often been 
driven by moral and humanitarian concerns. They see American interests engaged when 
American values are threatened, and they justify U.S. intervention, including use of force, 
when there is a high moral purpose. Similarly, cooperative security often represents liberal 
internationalists who assert that the United States has a core interest in pursuing a «world 
of liberty under law» (Posen and Ross 1996/97: 23). The post-Cold War era with increased 
interdependence, deepened connectivity and proliferation of conflict and insecurity across 
the world, demands that American interests and objectives are defined broadly and include 
affirmative goals. The United States must therefore pursue liberty both at home and abroad.  
While the desire to preserve American primacy makes its advocates predisposed to use 
American power, vigorously and unilaterally if necessary, against failed, failing, or rouge 
states with meaningful military capabilities, particularly in sensitive geo-strategic regions in 
order to maintain stability all over the world. Cooperative security relies on more 
multilateral use of force with support from the international system. It emphasizes the role 
of international institutions such as the United Nations and NATO to legitimize international 
engagement and preserve credibility. Due to its focus on liberal values and the concept of 
human security, this strategy desires an increased willingness to use force and undertake 
humanitarian interventions. 
While the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad are consistent with American 
political culture and ideology, in practice, these are highly case specific. When in accordance 
with the framework and principles of U.S. grand strategy, the United States may act for 
humanitarian purposes, but more often, a pragmatic realism governs. The current disaster in 
Syria highlights this tension in American foreign policy. Due to the large numbers of 
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 As documented in the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee’s study on CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program post 
9/11. The report disclosed that the ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ used by the CIA on detainees were more brutal and 
employed more extensively than the agency had portrayed. The program was mismanaged, lacked adequate oversight, and 
members of Congress and the White House were misled by the CIA about the effectiveness of its torture practices (United 
States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2014). 
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casualties and human rights violations, and growing regional instability and extremism 
involvement, this resembles a classic case for military intervention. Yet, at least for the time 
being, there seems to be little willingness to further intervene. When there is no direct 
threat to U.S. homeland, citizens or allies, or the U.S. economy, the prospects for large scale 
military intervention at present seem low, despite the unfolding humanitarian tragedy 
(Hooker 2015: 321). 
In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the Bush presidency, a new and more sober 
American self-understanding, characterized by a balance between continuity in the belief in 
their own values and increased insight into how the United States is perceived by the rest of 
the world, has developed. Many Americans felt that under George W. Bush, the pendulum 
that swings between assertiveness and retrenchment with regard to U.S. global role had 
swung too far toward unilateral engagement for idealistic purposes. The declined value 
placed on idealism under Obama has further led to conflicted American views about U.S. 
engagement in the world, and seems to strengthen the structural basis for a more pragmatic 
grand strategy.  
Obama’s Doctrine of Restraint26 reflects the current circumstance and temperament. He was 
elected to lead a nation exhausted by the two longest and most expensive wars in its history, 
and entered the White House with a pledge to bring home American troops from two major 
wars. Rather than continuing his predecessor’s outward focus, his priorities were domestic: 
nation building at home and recovery from the financial crisis (Cohen 2015a).  
The more restrained strategic options available for the United States entail an abandonment 
of exceptional values and affirmative goals. Restrainers seek a transformation of the military 
into a smaller force that goes to war only when it must, rather than by the goal of 
democracy promotion. For instance, neo-isolationism holds that America’s only true vital 
interest is national defense — defined as securing the liberty, property, and security of the 
homeland. Similarly, adherents of offshore balancing call for a strategy that would give up 
parts of the U.S. global agenda and focus on the protection of narrow and vital national 
security interests.  
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 The term is taken from Roger Cohen (2015a) “Obama’s Doctrine of Restraint”. The New York Times 10/12/2015 
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One prominent advocate of this approach, Barry Posen (2013: 117-118) argues that by not 
relying on America’s geo-strategic position, the strategy of primacy has damaged the 
nation’s prosperity and security in the long run:  
This undisciplined, expensive and bloody strategy has done untold harm to U.S. national 
security […] further raising the costs of carrying out its foreign policy […] Instead of relying on 
these inherent advantages for its security, the United States has acted with profound sense 
of insecurity, adopting an unnecessarily militarized and forward-leaning foreign policy. That 
strategy has generated predictable pushback. 
 
Both strategies are deeply rooted in the realist tradition and strongly believe that the United 
States should only intervene when it has vital interests at stake; for instance when the 
nation or a strategic ally are directly threatened, or when the nation’s broader credibility is 
at risk. Accordingly, for them, humanitarian interventions and democracy promotion are 
seen as costly affairs that make the United States less capable of intervening when American 
interests actually require it. Meanwhile, the option of selective engagement shows 
willingness to use both military force and international cooperation in order to further 
American interests and objectives. In this context, selective engagement represents a hybrid 
strategy that is firmly rooted in the realist goals of security and prosperity, but also includes 
liberal goals such as preservation of an open international economic order, protection of 
human rights and prevention of genocide. This approach is more selective as to where U.S. 
interests are defined and military force applied, but still open to engage and maintain allies 
and commitments in strategic areas. 
Restrainers would rather focus on security challenges such as preventing a powerful rival 
from shifting the global balance of power, counterterrorism, and limiting nuclear 
proliferation. More restrained strategies are therefore designed to reduce the nation’s 
international and military costs and commitments by cutting defense spending, withdrawing 
from certain alliance obligations, scaling back on deployments abroad, and reducing 
international expenditures (Mearsheimer 2011; Walt 2011; Posen 2013). 
This is in line with the findings of the previous chapter. According to Robert Kagan (2014), 
Americans are “world-weary”. Whether it is their support for a smaller, cheaper military or 
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their skepticism toward unilateral use of force, Americans are highly sensitive to the financial 
and moral costs of continuing Bush's expansive strategy. The desire to pull back from global 
affairs has increased during the past decades. This is partly due to the lengthy engagements 
in Iraq ad Afghanistan and the current security environment which is characterized by 
complexity and conflict, but the restraint also has domestic roots.  
Many Americans find that social, political and economic challenges at home are of greater 
priority than most foreign policy objectives. The Pew Research Center’s 2013 America's Place 
in the World survey indicates similar attitudes in terms of support for “soft power” efforts 
such as defending human rights abroad, helping improve living standards in developing 
countries and promoting democracy which  rate as relatively low priorities for the American 
public. When respondents were asked to list their top priorities for foreign policy, protecting 
the United States from terrorist attacks (83%) and preventing the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction (73%), as well as domestic concern such as protection of the jobs of 
American workers (81%) were at the top of the list. Majorities also say that reducing the 
country’s dependence on imported energy sources and combating international drug 
trafficking should be top priorities, while nearly half say the same about reducing illegal 
immigration (Pew Research Center 2013a: 10). 
Shapers argue that a strong and assertive grand strategy is crucial in order for American 
prosperity, security and ideals to flourish. As the world’s sole superpower, the protection of 
the liberal world order must remain at the core of American security. For some time to 
come, the Unites States is the only nation with the required resources to inhabit this role 
and to promote and protect the liberal values of the order on a global scale. This position 
reflects the embracement of a central feature of American exceptionalism; that America’s 
“special mission” is to lead the international order and actively promote its values abroad. 
Anne-Marie Slaughter (2015) also notes that standing for such a world and working to 
promote it is not only an exercise of American power; it is a source of that power.  
Meanwhile, restrainers in grand strategy find the United States overcommitted in world 
affairs and too involved in matters with little bearing on own security. They assert that it is 
not sustainable for the United States to preserve its current international position without 
either provoking counterbalancing by revisionist states or overextending its own resources. 
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Restrainers believe that the disproportionate fluctuation towards idealism these past 
decades has led to overstretch and domestic decline, and that the promotion of democracy 
around the world only serves to generate additional enemies and risk strategic exhaustion.  
For instance, Christopher Layne (2012a) argues that America’s leadership role, combined 
with various global interests throughout the world, makes retrenchment inevitable. 
Proponents of restraint often argue that an insistence on primacy is a recipe for strategic 
overstretch, national exhaustion, and a decline of power and influence. Yet shapers argue 
that an abandonment of America’s leadership role, particularly with regard to security, will 
most certainly have profound effect on the liberal world order. 
While the massive costs of global engagement — in terms of dollars and human lives spent, 
and focus on international issues at the expense of domestic ones — are clear and 
measurable. Those predisposed not to act do not necessarily take sufficient consideration of 
the fact that inaction has consequences as well. The costs of disengagement are more 
complex than those of engagement, and perhaps impossible to quantify before they are 
experienced. As such, some find that the risk of inaction may be greater than the risk of 
mistake (Fontaine and Flournoy 2014). Furthermore, in addition to the existing and emerging 
threats the world faces, it will undoubtedly be confronted with unexpected crises in the 
years to come. Such unknown events accentuate the importance of principles and objectives 
to guide American leadership in the world. 
Shapers in the debate on grand strategy argue that in order to preserve American global 
leadership, one must define policies that will make Americans more secure and prosperous, 
and that, at the same time, will promote and protect the core ideals and values of the United 
States. More assertive grand strategic options share the idea of maintenance and expansion 
of current alliances and commitments to account for the changing nature of the 
international system. The emergence of new actors and increased competition in the system 
means that the United States will have to work harder to maintain its military and diplomatic 
edge.  
Cooperative security encourages multilateralism, and put heavy reliance on alliances and 
commitments abroad regardless of economic or geopolitical position. The strategy of 
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cooperative security argues that in a world in which transnational threats are likely to 
increase, the international community has a responsibility to protect and prevent, which 
challenges the realist assumption that sovereignty is absolute. Accordingly, this approach 
values international institutions, norms and laws. If the United States were to pull back from 
the world order, it would be counterproductive for the pursuit of core American interests as 
they lay the foundation of the current order. The strategy of primacy is more unilateral in its 
approach. The main objective is to preserve American supremacy and the prevention of any 
serious contender to the hegemonic world order that emerged after the Cold War (Posen 
and Ross 1996/97; Posen 2013). 
However, providing the stability of the world order is a heavy burden, and the idea of 
seeking to share this burden makes sense in the aftermath of the lengthy engagements in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. More than 50 percent of Americans believe the United States plays “a 
less important and powerful role as a world leader than it did a decade ago” and a majority 
of Americans today express a desire for the United States to “mind its own business 
internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own” (Pew 
Research Center 2013a). Considering the current international and domestic context, 
adherents of engagement acknowledge that it may be tempting for leaders to abandon the 
current strategy and rather seek to pull back from the world. 
Neo-isolationists seek to keep the level of U.S. global engagement and commitments at a 
minimal; they are highly skeptical of the use of American power abroad and retain a deep 
animosity toward international institutions and international law. However, even as the 
American public is negative toward sustained American global leadership, their view does 
not represent an expression of isolationism nor a return to the United States as “a shining 
city upon the hill”. As the United States faces its future, it is clear that while the public 
opinion represents a clear desire to pull back in terms of foreign policy, there is a willingness 
to continue to engage and further integrate with the rest of the world on other fronts. 
Restraint does not necessarily involve the avoidance of all strategic alliances, but the desired 
direction is one of lowered cost and reduced commitment. Indeed, certain elements of 
restraint are merited as the economic circumstances of the United States and the leaner 
national security budget do not allow for the same level of American engagement. 
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Accordingly, the option of offshore balancing is proposed. This approach opens for alliances 
at an ad-hoc basis and for a limited time. It entails getting other states to do more for their 
own security so the United States can do less. It is thus, a strategy of burden shifting, instead 
of burden sharing. By setting clear priorities and emphasizing reliance on regional allies, it 
reduces the danger of being drawn into unnecessary conflicts and encourages other states 
to do more to help us. Equally important, it takes advantage of America’s favorable 
geopolitical position and exploits the tendency for regional powers to worry more about 
each other than about the United States (Walt 2005: 223).  
A strategy of offshore balancing means that the Unites States must give up its efforts to lead 
the liberal international order as it calls for deeper reliance on regional allies and a world 
role for the United States as a ‘balancer of last resort’ (McDonough 2009: 11; Brooks et al. 
2013; Posen 2013). Yet adherents of engagement speculate that the United States would be 
less secure, prosperous, and influential, were it to cede its global leadership role. Since this 
approach delegates the responsibility for regional stability to the major powers of the 
region, it also becomes a question of how the United States can accept an international 
system reliant on Russia, China and Iran to stabilize Asia and the Pacific, and the Middle East 
and Persian Gulf. According to Fontaine and Flournoy (201427): 
[D]isengagement is misguided and dangerous, for a simple reason: the world will not permit 
America to retreat significantly from its global leadership role without very real and 
substantial costs. 
 
The approach of selective engagement furthers an agenda that seeks to scale back U.S. 
commitments overseas, shift the burden somewhat to American allies, and maintain military 
deployments in regions critical to U.S. interests such as Europe, the Persian Gulf, and East 
Asia. According to Robert Art (2003: 9-10), this strategy is both politically feasible and 
affordable, steering «a middle course between not doing enough and attempting to do too 
much; it takes neither an isolationist, unilateralist path at one extreme nor a world 
policeman role at the other». Unlike most neo-isolationist ideas, engagement strategies 
posit that a forward posture that seeks to prevent significant threats from materializing is 
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preferable to one that employs offshore balancing. Therefore, selective engagement 
strategies would for example maintain core American alliances such as NATO and bilateral 
alliances with Japan and South Korea (ibid: 121-137). This corresponds quite well with 
Obama’s policies toward reduction of America’s military footprint in a changed world and 
the empowerment of other countries to do more (Department of Defense 2012; The White 
House 2015).  
However, while the American public seems to desire a more restrained strategy for America 
in the future, Obama’s Doctrine of Restraint is met with criticism (Cohen 2015b). Apparently, 
the pendulum has swung too far in the direction of retrenchment which is unacceptable as 
most Americans still believe strongly in the notion of American exceptionalism. As such, the 
American public favors the liberal world order, but they are no longer willing to sacrifice as 
much to uphold it. This is a product of what Robert Kagan (2014) has termed a “search for 
normalcy” — the belief that the United States does too much in terms of solving world 
problems and should return to being a more normal kind of great power, more attuned to its 
own domestic needs and less focused on the collective interests of the world. 
 
6.3 Implications for the liberal world order 
 
This thesis has shown that American beliefs in the exceptionalist narrative are changing, and 
the views of America’s role as keeper of the world order are eroding. U.S. grand strategy — 
including its emphasis on military, diplomatic, and economic means — is of great importance 
for the world at large, and any strategic adjustments may have consequences for the entire 
global order. Following this trend, it is significant to discuss the implications for the liberal 
world order and the promotion of collective interests if the declined belief in America as an 
exceptional nation leads the United States to focus on its material interests at the expense 
of its ideals, and toward further retrenchment and restraint in its grand strategy. Robert 
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Kagan (201428) believes that unless Americans can be led back to «an understanding of their 
enlightened self-interest, to see again how their fate is entangled with that of the world, 
then the prospects for a peaceful twenty-first century in which Americans and American 
principles can thrive will be bleak». According to Joseph S. Nye (2015), the inability or 
unwillingness of American leadership to use power may become its greatest problem. 
Similarly, G. John Ikenberry (2008: 45-46) states that the greatest threat to U.S. national 
security today is the erosion of the institutional foundations of the world order. 
In the early 1990s, Samuel Huntington (1991: 287) asked: «What would happen […] if the 
American model no longer embodied strength and success, no longer seemed to be the 
winning model? ». His conclusion was that: 
People around the world would come to see the United States as a declining power, 
characterized by political stagnation, economic inefficiency, and social chaos. If this 
happened, the perceived failures of the United States would inevitably be seen as failures of 
democracy (ibid). 
 
In several manners, the quote seems to correspond with America’s current standing in the 
world. Geopolitical challenges appears to have returned to international politics as the 
foundations of the liberal world order has begun to erode due to the growing isolationist 
sentiments of the American public, nervous allies, and ambitious rivals (Stephens 2014: 126). 
The United States’ uncertainty about its future role is already causing adjustments in the 
world order. Robert Kagan (2014) writes that the world will change much more quickly than 
restrainers imagine, and there is no democratic superpower waiting in the wings to save the 
world if the United States falters.  
Richard Haass (2014: 76) argues that the unraveling of the world order is due to three 
trends; power in the world has diffused across a greater number and range of actors, respect 
for the American economic and political model has diminished, and the inconsistency of 
specific U.S. policy choices, especially in the Middle East. The result is that while the United 
States’ absolute strength remains considerable, American influence has diminished. While 
some believe that because of this, it is time for America to pull back and let others shoulder 
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more of the world’s burdens, others find that the current security environment makes it 
hard for the United States to retreat significantly from its global role without substantial 
costs.  
Walter Russell Mead (2014: 69) predicts a return to geopolitics in international relations, and 
the rise of revisionist powers in the system. As the world sense a United States not eager to 
carry the burden of global responsibility, instability and uncertainty grows. First of all, 
declined American influence in the international system might unleash growing challenges 
from ambitious regional powers seeking to revise their position and reshape the system in 
ways that reflect their own interests, norms and values. Secondly, for Americans allies, U.S. 
security guarantees are meaningless unless the United States is able and willing to meet 
them. Consequently, this has raised doubts about American judgment and the reliability of 
both the United States’ threats and promises.  
Whether it is Russia annexing Crimea, aggressive Chinese claims of maritime borders in the 
South China Sea, or Iran’s efforts to influence events in the Middle East through its alliances 
with Syria and Hezbollah, issues of geopolitical importance are emerging. While the United 
States and its allies in Europe would like to continue the shift in international relations away 
from zero-sum issues toward win-win ones, and move past the geopolitical issues of territory 
and material power capabilities toward focus on those of the world order and global 
governance, the current security environment is making the task of promoting and 
maintaining the world order a challenging one. 
On the other hand, G. John Ikenberry (2014: 80-81) argues that Walter Russell Mead is 
overestimating the ability of the “coalition of illiberal powers” to revise the post-Cold War 
settlement and the American-led world order that underlines it. While Ikenberry 
acknowledges that these states look for opportunities to resist U.S. global leadership and to 
push back against it. He finds that Mead’s focus on the objective of these revisionist states 
to build regional spheres of influence in order to threaten the foundations of U.S. leadership 
and the global order represents a misreading of the character of the existing order which is 
more stable and expansive than Mead depicts.  
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Because of the sustained efforts taken by the United States since World War II to build a 
system of multilateral institutions, alliances, trade agreements, and political partnerships, 
Ikenberry (2011) asserts that the world order will remain stable and prevail even as 
America’s ability to protect and promote it weakens. He believes that the current world 
order has led countries toward cooperation, and strengthened the global norms and rules 
which undercut the legitimacy of old-fashioned spheres of influence, regional domination 
and territorial claims. Ikenberry (2014: 84) argues that Mead’s vision of a contest over 
Eurasia misunderstands the more profound power transition under way: the increasing 
ascendancy of liberal capitalist democracy. In addition, the world order has provided the 
United States with the capacities, partnerships and principles necessary to confront the 
current challenges of revisionist states. America’s alliances, partnerships, multilateralism and 
democracy represents the core tools available for U.S. leadership, and according to 
Ikenberry (2014: 81), these are winning the struggles over geopolitics and the world order. 
Greater uncertainty in the international system is increasing volatility in world politics. 
According to Bremmer (2015) and Mead (2014), the outcome of that volatility will depend 
on the manner in which China, Russia and Iran seeks to pursue its revisionist goals, establish 
their spheres of influence, and challenge American interests in the world. They argue that 
the United States will have very little influence over these developments, so the better 
course of action is to stand aloof from them and find another purpose for American energy 
and values. Meanwhile, Ikenberry (2014) and Kagan (2012; 2014), and Nye (2015) argue that 
due to its economic and geopolitical foundations, none of America’s adversaries are 
currently prepared to take on the costs and risks of challenging the United States as of yet. 
Although U.S. hegemony eventually will diminish, the nation’s power is still unrivaled. 
Accordingly, for some time to come, the United States will preserve its ability to influence 
global events as long as it avoids overstretch. 
As the international system grows more multipolar with an increasing diversity of actors, Ian 
Bremmer (2015) writes that the United States no longer has the influence necessary to play 
the role of world leader. More importantly, he says, because of the responsibilities that 
come with it, the American public is no longer supportive of such a role. The public opinion 
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shows that Americans believe the United States does too much in terms of solving world 
problems. 
In an effort to protect American security and prosperity, the promotion of a liberal economic 
order and close security commitments with allies in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East 
has been essential to American grand strategy and the advancement of American interests 
since the end of World War II. On that account, Ikenberry believes the appropriate grand 
strategy for the United States must be «one aimed at restoring its role as the recognized and 
legitimate leader of the system and rebuilding the institutions and partnerships upon which 
this leadership position is based» (Ikenberry 2008: 45-46). This would mean an increase of 
the present level of America’s military. Interventionists argue that the current levels of 
military capacity and defense spending is inadequate to shoulder the burdens of the world. 
As Marco Rubio (2015: 110) puts it: «the world is at its safest when America is at its 
strongest» 
In making their case for maintaining the United States’ policy of deep engagement, Stephen 
G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth (2013: 130) stress that U.S. security 
commitment to allied states in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, together with 
American preponderance of power, stifles regional rivalries and hinders the resurgence of a 
dangerous era of multipolar power politics. Advocates of retrenchment, such as Barry Posen 
(2013), recognize that the world will become a much more dangerous place as new powers 
emerge. They just believe that these regional conflicts will not affect the United States. 
America can protect itself due to its geopolitical position and behind its nuclear deterrent. 
The United States only has to worry about other regions if one rival power is poised to 
dominate East Asia, Europe, or the Middle East. The sheer physics of balancing means this is 
very unlikely to happen, but if it did there would be enough time to intervene and tip the 
balance against the rival. They even argue that the United States could manipulate regional 
tensions to its own benefit. 
Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth (2013: 130) on the other hand, argue that continued U.S. 
security commitments supplies both reassurance and deterrence,  reduces competition in 
key regions and acts as a check against potential rivals. Moreover, active management of the 
world order helps the Unites States in maintaining an open world economy and gives 
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Washington leverage in economic negotiations. This strategy also makes it easier for the 
United States to secure cooperation for combating a wide range of global threats. The 
United States is the ultimate provider of security due to its power and its alliance system, 
which supports its global reach and power projection. They believe the strategy of deep 
engagement is the appropriate one as the United States faces its future, because in their 
view the United States would be less secure, prosperous, and influential, were it to cede its 
global leadership role (Brooks et al. 2013: 131-132). From this perspective, the rise of a peer 
competitor in Eurasia would pose a dramatic threat to international order and significantly 
increase the risk of war. 
Yet, most of the strategists who reject deep engagement do not call for isolationism. They 
favor continued U.S. engagement, albeit in a more restrained, highly selective, and 
strategically sustainable way. They believe the United States should seek to maintain 
favorable balances of power in key regions, but that it does not need to provide all the 
military muscle itself and certainly should not try to dictate or control the political evolution 
of these areas with military force. They believe a more restrained approach would preserve 
core U.S. interests at an acceptable cost, and would be far better suited to the current 
distribution of global power (Walt 2013). 
 
6.4 The case for a sustainable U.S. grand strategy 
 
A country’s actual grand strategy will often be a hybrid of ideal types and American national 
security strategies tend to contain elements from several of these schools. For instance, 
both Clinton and Bush-era National Security Strategies contain elements of selective 
engagement, cooperative security and primacy (Center for a New American Security 2008: 
17). Today, the international security environment has become more complex and the 
United States faces a broader set of challenges than those of the previous era. Therefore, 
the limited resources available for American leadership and the public’s unwillingness to 
engage in international affairs, has led to an adjustment in its global leadership role. 
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The American public opinion and the declined belief in the United States as an exceptional 
nation seem to reflect an overall tiredness to world affairs, especially lengthy engagements 
and military commitments abroad. This represents an increased emphasis on the tradition of 
limited liability in American strategic culture at the expense of exceptional and liberal ideals. 
At the same time, the value placed on idealism and the influence of the classical liberal 
assumptions has, most likely, been weakened for some time to come following the identity 
crisis caused primarily by the setbacks of the past decades. This reinforce the argument 
made by the political scientists Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz (2007), that 
demographic and political shifts within the United States are making it harder and harder to 
build support for a grand strategy based on liberal internationalist principles. 
Consequently, a grand strategy around the idea of maintaining American international 
leadership, but doing so at lower costs will better reflect the changing geography of global 
power. A combined appreciation for balance of power realism and discriminate intervention 
with the focus on multilateral institutions of liberal internationalism are more in line with 
the underlying and enduring principles reflected in American power, the bureaucracy, and 
public attitudes. In order to sustain its leadership role and its capacity to influence 
international events, certain strategic choices must be made. The United States must 
reorient its polices, balance the hard and soft powers at its disposal, and focus on homeland 
security rather than towards costly military presence abroad.  
The United States needs to reduce its strategic and military overstretch, avoid prolonged 
stability operations and find more discrete ways of applying force when it is required. It 
should strengthen its homeland security apparatuses to counter the threat of terrorism at 
home. While non-state actors and terrorist organizations oppose American values, currently 
they do not pose a direct existential threat to the United States and none of these groups 
possess conventional military capabilities equal to those of the United States and its allies. In 
addition, the United States should rely on diplomacy to accommodate its allies as well as its 
rivals. It should seek to peacefully engage with major powers such as China and Russia, and 
attempt to find diplomatic solutions to counter nuclear proliferations by rogue state actors 
such as Iran and North Korea. 
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The United States also needs to overcome its national challenges and setting its house in 
order (Brzezinski 2012: 37, 44-45). Richard Haass (2013: 1-10) made a similar case in his book 
Foreign Policy Begins at Home: 
Many of the foundations of this country’s power are eroding […] Isolationism would be folly. 
At the same time, the United States must become significantly more discriminating in 
choosing what it does in the world and how it does it. Hard choices need to be made […] For 
the last two decades, American foreign policy […] has quite simply overreached. 
 
The perceived belief that the United States is in decline has often leads to the conclusion 
that America must focus inwardly and downsize its reach, its ambitions, and its 
responsibilities in the world. But in fact, responsible foreign and domestic policies are 
mutually reinforcing, as Richard Haass (2014: 79) writes: «a stable world is good for the 
home front, and a successful home front provides the resources needed for American global 
leadership». 
Such a strategy reflects the current international and domestic setting for several reasons: 
First, the emphasis on multilateralism and international institutions offers an opportunity for 
greater burden sharing with regard to international engagement and commitments; in 
addition it addresses real and perceived declines in American power and influence and seeks 
to restore the domestic foundations of America’s role abroad. Second, the focus on balance 
of power means that this strategy does not seek to challenge emerging competitors, which 
would require conventional rather than the counter-insurgency capabilities that the military 
has refined in recent years. Third, it calls for a less assertive international role for the United 
States, attends to concerns about the U.S. image abroad, and prefers diplomacy over force 
without withdrawing international military presence altogether (Kreps 2009: 645). This 
corresponds to the position of American exceptionalism in today’s society as it reflects the 
present reconciliation between idealism and realism, as well as the two traits of American 
strategic culture. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
The issue of how the United States can best balance its pressing needs at home with its 
established role as a world leader and commitments abroad is as old as the nation itself. The 
pendulum has fluctuated between greater and lesser willingness to engage in the world 
which, in part, is due to the unique dynamics that shape America’s role in the world. With 
reference to the neoclassical realist framework, which integrates the importance of 
domestic ideas, strategic culture, and national discourse to the realm of realism in order to 
include domestic-level factors when explaining foreign policy behavior, the premise of this 
thesis is that American exceptionalism, defined as the national identity of the American 
people, profoundly affects how the United States acts and justifies its behavior in the world, 
and act as a filter through which material and systemic factors are translated into strategic 
choice.  
The unique American self-understanding and the synthesis between idealism and realism in 
American strategic culture, represents a guiding principle for policy formulation in the 
United States and endorses contradictory impulses in foreign policy and ambivalent views on 
what role, if any, the United States should play in the world. Three fundamental ideas 
constitute American exceptionalism: the belief in America’s superiority, its historical mission, 
and the fact that the United States shall rise to power but never decline. These ideas are 
connected to the three selected indicators through their Anglo-Protestant roots.  
The preservation of American exceptionalism and the nation’s idealistic values and ideals 
will determine the nation’s grand strategic course for the coming years. Consequently, the 
current debate on American exceptionalism can be understood as a symptom of the U.S. 
identity crisis that has formed in the wake of the erosion of the liberal world order and the 
scholarly discussion of America’s decline in power. The international system has begun to 
unravel following the challenges and setbacks of the past decades which might indicate a 
shift toward a ‘post-post-Cold War era’ or a world characterized by global disorder. 
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Chapter 5 of this thesis finds adjustments in the belief in American exceptionalism in the 
United States today. The American public in general, and the younger generation in 
particular, is turning away from some of its core pillars; the view of religion in society and 
politics, the idea of an American global leadership role and the belief in upward mobility 
have all declined these past decades due to fundamental changes of social, cultural, 
economic, and political nature in the United States. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the Global 
War on Terror, the exceptional American self-understanding has developed into a more 
sober one that reflects a balance between the continued belief in the aspects that make 
America great and increased insight into how the United States is perceived by the rest of 
the world. In addition, the international security environment has become more complex as 
the United States faces a broader set of challenges than those of the previous era. 
Therefore, the limited resources available for American leadership and the publics seemingly 
unwillingness to engage in international affairs, has further led to conflicted American views 
about America’s global role. Currently, it is a debate between restrainers and shapers: 
between those who think the United States is overextended in the world and those who 
continue to believe in Pax Americana. A national sentiment of retrenchment is spreading in 
the United States, and engagement abroad is seen as too expensive, too risky and too prone 
to failure. The adjustments in the American public opinion have undoubtedly caused 
reluctance to get involved in new international engagements and in the use force during 
Obama’s tenure, and is likely to continue to do so in years to come. The role of American 
exceptionalism as grounds for the unilateral interventionism of the Bush presidency has lost 
meaning in the American society, but a shift back to the former idealistic and exemplary 
picture of the United States as “a shining city upon the hill” is not likely either. 
Chapter 6 finds that the question of whether to engage or retreat limns the contours of a 
useful debate on the appropriate global role for the United States. In addition, it raises the 
discussion on the implications for the liberal world order if the United States were to further 
disengage from world affairs and abandon of some of its idealistic foundations. 
The power and influence of the United States and its liberal norms and values constitute 
essential parts of the current world order, and today this foundation is beginning to unravel. 
While some believe that because of this, it is time for America to pull back and let others 
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shoulder more of the world’s burdens, others find that the current security environment 
makes it hard for the United States to retreat significantly from its global role without 
substantial costs.  
For more than seventy years some version of primacy has been the guiding principle for 
American grand strategy, but today Americans are world-weary and seem unwilling to 
support assertive and deeply engaged strategies for the United States. Burden-sharing in 
world affairs and more inwardly focus on own domestic challenges are more in line with the 
public opinion. Even as most politicians still continue to assert their commitment to a global 
American leadership, a more restrained view has also taken hold among the American public 
and scholars of international relations over the past decades. Accordingly retrenchment 
seems to fit the moment. 
Joseph S. Nye (2015) states that the current moment does not represent the end of the 
American era. Yet, in a world of dynamic change and shaky geopolitical equilibrium, the 
United States needs to formulate a grand strategy that will frame its interests, shape the 
various instruments of national power, and arrange the necessary investments to 
underwrite its national security interests. Due to its economic and geopolitical position, the 
U.S. power is still unrivaled in the world order. Renewing its economic foundation and 
getting its house in order will have to be an integral part of any grand strategy for the United 
States as it faces its future, but at the same time it cannot pull away from its international 
role and the challenges beyond its borders. 
Domestically, the United States is characterized by several social, political and economic 
challenges that the public find are of greater priority than most foreign policy objectives. 
While the desire to pull back has increased, Americans continue to wish for a leadership role 
for the United States and are positive to deeper involvement in the global economy. Rather 
than understanding these as desires toward isolationism in terms of foreign policy, this 
thesis propose that these findings should be understood as an expression of reasonable 
assessments of the domestic roots for American behavior abroad. In order to revive 
America’s leadership role in the world and its capacity to influence the international order 
and events, the United States needs to overcome its domestic challenges and reorient its 
foreign policy (Brzezinski 2012: 37, 44-45).  
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The uncertainty regarding the future global role of the United States is currently leading to 
insecurity and adjustments in the world order. Issues of geopolitical nature appear to have 
returned to international relations, and the foundation of the order is eroding because of 
American sentiments of retrenchment, nervous allies and ambitious revisionist nations. The 
result is that while the United States’ absolute strength remains considerable, American 
influence has diminished in the international system. American foreign policy leadership 
today and in coming years will, in parts, depend on the vigor and strength of the nation’s 
society and economy. Leaders of the United States will be hard pressed to obtain sustained 
support at home and credibility abroad for its foreign policy without substantial progress on 
a host of as yet inadequately addressed domestic social and economic challenges (Hormats 
2014). Such themes are likely to shape the debate heading into the 2016 elections. 
This thesis proposes a hybrid solution for American grand strategy in order for the United 
States to best confront its existing and emerging challenges, as well as prepare for the 
unknowns of the years ahead. This strategy is also seemingly consistent with the current 
domestic setting in the United States. In order to sustain its leadership role and its capacity 
to influence international events, the United States must make certain strategic choices to 
avoid overstretch and regain domestic support for its foreign policy. Thus, a strategy based 
on a continued leadership role for the United States, but at a lower cost due to higher levels 
of burden-sharing between America’s allies and partners, reflects the American public’s 
desire for a shared leadership role. In addition, a combination of balance of power realism 
and discriminate intervention with the focus on multilateral institutions and liberal 
internationalism represents the two aspects of American strategic culture and the ebb and 
flow between interests and ideals in American foreign policy. 
While the liberal aspect of American strategic culture has led the United States toward more 
assertive and idealistic policies, the current public opinion and the expressed desire for a 
more modest and consensual foreign policy correspond with the second aspect of American 
strategic culture. The wish to limit costs overseas and focus on problems at home might 
have some grounds in the overreach of the ‘War on terror’ and its financial and moral costs. 
This idea is clearly shared by the current president who is promoting a limited-liability global 
leadership for the United States: 
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The United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our core interests 
demand it — when our people are threatened, when our livelihoods are at stake, when the 
security of our allies is in danger (Obama 2014) 
 
That there is more continuity than change in American grand strategy is consistent with the 
structural constraints that neoclassical realism argues influences adjustments — the 
international system, bureaucracy, and public opinion. The international distribution of 
power determines whether a state can pursue an expansive or restrained grand strategy. 
The organization of the bureaucracies which carries out a nation’s grand strategy, 
particularly the Department of Defense and the State Department, determines how well 
they are equipped to pursue the nation’s interests. The public opinion represents an 
obstacle for mobilization, since an enduring grand strategy is unsustainable without the 
public support.  
The lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan humbled American’s perceptions of their country’s 
power. The prevailing view going into Iraq was that the projection of American power could 
be «a force of good». As upheaval rather than democracy took root in the Middle East 
following the interventions, it became clear that decision-makers had overestimated the 
capacity of the United States to shape the course of events abroad or the behavior of other 
states. Another factor that has contributed to the perception of waning American power was 
the growing sense of overstretch in the world (Kreps 2009: 363). 
The policies led by President Obama seems suited to the current moment in the United 
States. Since his inauguration, he has believed that the current international environment, 
combined with greater domestic challenges and less national resources available, make it 
necessary for the United States to behave in a more restrained and pragmatic manner in the 
world. American grand strategy under Obama has been multifaceted and he gives less value 
to the concept of American exceptionalism than his predecessors. His strategy sometimes 
includes assertive components such as the Afghan surge in 2009-2010, the 2011 intervention 
in Libya which toppled Qaddafi, the take down Osama Bin Laden, the Pivot to Asia, 
continued focus on counterterrorism, and the increased use of unmanned drone strikes 
against terrorist organizations. The United States also continues to uphold its worldwide 
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system of alliances, which certainly is at a higher level than more restrained strategies would 
prefer (Stephens 2014).  
However, a modest form of strategic retrenchment has been a central element of Obama’s 
grand strategy. This has been reflected for instance in the patterns of military spending, 
force posture, and security strategy (Dueck 2015). In addition, he has been more selective as 
to where U.S. interests are defined and military force applied to reduce America’s footprint 
in the world (Department of Defense 2012). Christopher Layne (2012b) stated that the 2012 
Defense Strategic Guidance represented a significant move toward offshore balancing, and 
the 2015 National Security Strategy does not reverse that direction.  
Obama’s strategy of “nation building at home” also converges with the public’s desire for 
focus on domestic challenges first. In total, this adds up to a global role for the United States, 
more similar to the traditional great powers of the past, which focuses on defensive national 
interest rather than the keeper of the world order which promotes international collective 
interests (Stephens 2014).  
The main issue for the Obama administration, however, is the incoherent manner in which 
these policies have been expressed to the America public and the inconsistency in the 
implementation which has led to criticism across partisan lines. For instance, Hillary Clinton 
(2014) criticized Obama for being slow and cautions as overcompensation for the policies led 
under Bush, and stated that: «Great nations need organizing principles, and 'Don't do stupid 
stuff' is not an organizing principle». Another example is Marco Rubio (2015: 115) who 
writes that: «Obama has put the international system at the mercy of the most ruthless 
aggressors. They are constantly seeking to undermine the basic principles of the post-1945 
world by challenging American military primacy, threatening the global commons, and 
undermining liberal values». 
Even though Obama’s grand strategy seems suitable, most politicians continue to assert 
their commitment to global leadership as they believe that further erosions in America’s 
military, economic and moral strength will lead to further breakdown in the global order and 
challenge domestic security and prosperity. In an interview with CBS’s Face the Nation, 
Hillary Clinton (2015) began to distance herself from Obama’s record, especially with regard 
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to foreign policy and she presented a change in foreign policy course if she wins the 
Presidency. She represents the exceptionalist vision of U.S. global role, and believes that the 
stability of the system and its ability to solve current challenges depends on an activist and 
assertive grand strategy for the United States. The importance of American leadership is also 
reflected in Marco Rubio’s (2015: 115) vision for U.S. foreign policy: «Retrenchment and 
retreat are not our destiny. The United States, by its presence alone, has the ability to alter 
balances, realign regional powers, promote stability, and enhance liberty». 
The next president is likely to move back to a more ambitious and exceptionalistic foreign 
policy. Most of the 2016 presidential candidates represent foreign policy approaches that 
will move away from the retrenchment of the Obama administration and toward renewed 
American leadership in the world. 
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